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

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THESIS

MANPOWER MANAGEMENT FOR JOINT SPECIALTY OFFICERS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

by

John G. Koran III

December, 1990

Thesis Advisor: James E. Suchan

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92-04329

92 2 18 018

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY	3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE	
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)	5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School 6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (*If applicable*) 55	7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School
6c. ADDRESS (*City, State, and ZIP Code*) Monterey, CA 93943-5000	7b. ADDRESS (*City, State, and ZIP Code*) Monterey, CA 93943-5000
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION 8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (*If applicable*)	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER
8c. ADDRESS (*City, State, and ZIP Code*)	10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS Program Element No / Project No / Task No / Work Unit Accession Number

11. TITLE (*Include Security Classification*)
MANPOWER MANAGEMENT FOR JOINT SPECIALTY OFFICERS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Koran, III, John, Gordon

13a. TYPE OF REPORT	13b. TIME COVERED	14. DATE OF REPORT (*year, month, day*)	15. PAGE COUNT
Master's Thesis	From To	1990, DECEMBER	149

16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (*continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number*)
FIELD	GROUP	SUBGROUP	Joint Specialty, Joint Duty Assignment, Joint Professional Military Education, Reorganization, Title IV, manpower management, Joint Duty Assignment List

19. ABSTRACT (*continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number*)

This thesis investigates the development of Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) manegement policies mandated by the law. Individual service manpower management procedures for the nomination/selection for Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) and Joint Specialty Officer designation are presented and analyzed. The results indicate significant progress has been made towards fulfilling the Title IV requirements regarding JPME, JSO designation, and improving the quality and stability of officers assigned to Joint Duty Assignments.

20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT	21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
☒ UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED ☐ SAME AS REPORT ☐ DTIC USERS	UNCLASSIFIED	
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL James E. Suchan	22b. TELEPHONE (*Include Area code*) (408) 646-2905	22c. OFFICE SYMBOL AS/Sa

DD FORM 1473, 84 MAR — 83 APR edition may be used until exhausted. All other editions are obsolete.

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MANPOWER MANAGEMENT FOR JOINT SPECIALTY OFFICERS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT
from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 1990

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ABSTRACT

MANPOWER MANAGEMENT FOR JOINT SPECIALTY OFFICERS:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

This thesis investigates the development of Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) management policies mandated by the law. Individual service manpower management procedures for the nomination/selection for Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) and Joint Specialty Officer designation are presented and analyzed. The size and composition of the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) is also presented and analyzed. The results indicate significant progress has been made towards fulfilling the Title IV requirements regarding JPME, JSO designation, and improving the quality and stability of officers assigned to Joint Duty Assignments.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION 1
A. OVERVIEW 1
1. Title IV 2
2. Service Implementation 4
B. PURPOSE OF THESIS 6
C. OUTLINE OF THESIS 7
II. GENESIS OF TITLE IV 8
A. OVERVIEW 8
B. THE BEGINNING OF THE JOINT STRUCTURE 10
1. World War II 11
2. Post World War II 12
C. RECENT JOINT OPERATIONS 15
1. The Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission 17
2. Grenada 18
D. RECENT REORGANIZATION PROPOSALS 20
1. General Jones' Reorganization Proposal ... 20
2. General Meyer's Reform Proposal 25
3. JCS Reorganization Act of 1983 26
4. Senate Armed Services Committee Report ... 26
E. SUMMARY 28
III. THE LAW AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION 30
A. OVERVIEW 30
B. KEY PROVISIONS OF TITLE IV 30
1. Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) 31

2. Joint Duty Assignment (JDA) 33

3. Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) 36

4. Joint Duty Tour Length 37

5. Promotions 38

C. JOINT OFFICER MANAGEMENT 40

1. Major Sections of Title IV 40

2. 1987 Amendments (Public Law 100-180) ... 47

3. 1988 Amendments (Public Law 100-456) ... 48

4. 1989 Amendments (Public Law 101-189) ... 49

D. IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS 50

E. SUMMARY 55

IV. SERVICE SELECTION PROCEDURES 57

A. OVERVIEW 57

B. CAREER PATHS AND MODELING TITLE IV IMPLEMENTATION 57

C. SELECTION FOR JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION 64

1. PME Selection Processes 71

D. JOINT SPECIALTY OFFICER NOMINATION AND DESIGNATION 76

E. JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENT MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM (JDAMIS) 85

F. SUMMARY 89

V. ANALYSIS OF PROCEDURES 90

A. OVERVIEW 90

B. ANALYSIS OF THE JOINT MANPOWER MANAGEMENT PROCESS 90

C. JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION SELECTION ANALYSIS 98

D. NOMINATION AND SELECTION OF JOINT SPECIALTY OFFICERS 107

E. ANALYSIS OF THE JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENT LIST 111

F. JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENT MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM 114

G. SUMMARY 115

VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 116

A. SUMMARY 116

B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 116

C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 121

APPENDIX (EXAMPLES OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE'S REPORT TO CONGRESS) 123

LIST OF REFERENCES 134

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 137

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE I	STUDIES AND PLANS ON DEFENSE REFORM	16
TABLE II	1990 JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENT LIST BY SERVICE AND RANK	34
TABLE III	1990 JOINT DUTY CRITICAL BILLETS BY SERVICE AND RANK	35
TABLE IV	CRITICAL OCCUPATION SPECIALTIES BY SERVICE	37
TABLE V	NAVY JOINT SPECIALTY ADDITIONAL QUALIFICATION DESIGNATORS	42
TABLE VI	FIELD GRADE EXPERIENCE OF GENERAL OFFICERS	52
TABLE VII	INTERMEDIATE AND SENIOR SERVICE SCHOOLS ..	65
TABLE VIII	COMPARISON OF JOINTNESS IN STUDENT ENROLLMENT (ACADEMIC YEAR 1987-1988)	68
TABLE IX	OFFICERS IN INTERMEDIATE PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION (ACADEMIC YEAR 1987-1988)	69
TABLE X	ANNUAL PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION ENROLLMENT (ACADEMIC YEAR 1987-1988)	71
TABLE XI	JOINT SPECIALTY OFFICER SELECTION AS OF 1 OCTOBER 1989	77
TABLE XII	JOINT SPECIALTY QUALIFICATION STATUS CODES	82
TABLE XIII	1990 JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENT LIST BY SERVICE AND RANK	84
TABLE XIV	1990 CRITICAL OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (COS) BILLETS ON THE JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENT LIST	84
TABLE XV	OFFICERS IN INTERMEDIATE LEVEL PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION (ACADEMIC YEAR 1987-1988)	100
TABLE XVI	OFFICERS IN SENIOR LEVEL PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION (ACADEMIC YEAR 1987-1988)	100

TABLE XVII STUDENT ENROLLMENT DISTRIBUTION FOR SERVICE SCHOOLS 102

TABLE XVIII SELECTION OF OFFICERS FOR AWARD OF THE JOINT SPECIALTY (1988) 108

TABLE XIX SELECTION OF OFFICERS FOR AWARD OF THE JOINT SPECIALTY (1989) 110

TABLE XX JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENT LIST COMPOSITION BY SERVICE (PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL JDAL 113

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 Joint Specialty Officer Designation Flow Diagram 61

Figure 2 Primary Educational Sequencing for JSO Qualification 62

Figure 3 Joint Duty Assignment List Trends by Service 86

Figure 4 Joint Duty Assignment List Trends for Critical Occupational Specialties 87

Figure 5 Army Command and General Staff College Student Enrollment Ratios 103

Figure 6 College of the Naval Command and Staff Student Enrollment Ratios 104

Figure 7 Air Command and Staff College Student Enrollment Ratios 105

Figure 8 Marine Corps Command and Staff College Student Enrollment Ratios 106

Figure 9 Joint Specialty Officer and Total O-4 and Above Officer Distribution Comparison 112

I. INTRODUCTION

A. OVERVIEW

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 established many significant and far-reaching changes in the conduct of Department of Defense affairs. The purpose of the law is:

1) to reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority in the Department;

2) to improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense;

3) to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands;

4) to ensure that the authority of the commanders of unified and specified combatant commands is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned to their commands;

5) to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning;

6) to provide for more efficient use of defense resources;

7) to improve joint officer management policies; and

8) otherwise, to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense, and for other purposes. [Ref. 1: 993-994]

These changes are largely in response to many studies and reports that focused on organization and personnel problems affecting joint military operations. Several

recent joint operations, in particular, were criticized for joint organization inefficiencies. The aborted Iranian hostage rescue mission and the reported communication and coordination difficulties during the Grenada operation were attributed to the inability of the services to coordinate and successfully conduct joint operations [Ref. 2:359-370]. Additionally, the issue of the quality of personnel assigned to joint duty assignments involving multi-service or multi-national planning and operations was questioned by Congress. This stirred interest and sparked debates in Congress concerning the quality and capability of the United States in joint military operations. Congress wanted to effect changes in the Department of Defense (DOD) organization and wanted to improve joint operations and inter-service cooperation. The Goldwater-Nichols Act is the result of Congress's desire to improve DOD functions.

1. Title IV

This thesis will focus specifically on Title IV of the legislation, which details many requirements for the creation and management of "Joint Specialty Officers" (JSO). Title IV of the Act, Joint Officer Personnel Policy, establishes the guidelines for joint officer management and outlines detailed legislation to carry out the restructuring of joint professional military education (JPME) and joint duty assignments (JDA). To monitor implementation of all the provisions, Congress has required a significant array of reports from the Services,

the Joint Staff, and the Secretary of Defense. The reports are designed to show the extent to which each military department is providing officers to fill that department's share of joint duty assignments.

Title IV of the legislation also addresses requirements for establishing education and personnel management policies for the joint specialty officer. Additionally, Title IV details requirements for joint duty assignments as prerequisite for promotion to general or flag officer grade. Congress also included many other detailed requirements and restrictions on how the services are to manage joint officers.

The cornerstone of Title IV is the requirement to place top-quality officers in all joint duty assignments. Some other key provisions of Title IV include:

1) Development of Joint Specialty Officers educated, trained and oriented towards joint matters.

2) Development of a joint duty assignment list (JDAL) qualifying specific multi-service or multi-national billets for joint duty assignments.

3) Promotion rates for officers with joint duty experience are expected to at least equal the promotion rates for all officers of that armed force in the same grade and category.

4) Assignment to a JDA as their next duty for all officers with the Joint Specialty and at least fifty percent of other officers completing joint professional military education (JPME).

5) Completion of joint duty assignments as prerequisite for promotion to general or flag officer grades.

6) Prescription that minimum joint duty tour shall be 2 years for flag ranks (originally 3 years) and 3 years for other officers (originally 3 1/2 years).

7) Requirement that the Secretary of Defense issue guidelines and require various reports to ensure implementation of the legislation.

The Secretary of Defense is responsible for establishing career guidelines for officers with the joint specialty. The guidelines shall include criteria for selection, military education, training, types of duty assignments, and other matters considered appropriate [Ref. 1: 1025-1026].

2. Service Implementation

The services are currently implementing the requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation and adjusting personnel management procedures to meet the guidelines established by the Secretary of Defense. This has not been done without critical evaluation and valuable feedback (i.e., In statements before Congress in the National Defense Authorization Acts of 1988 and 1989, the services were united in stating tour lengths should be reduced and extensions of transition periods were needed). Additionally, a joint duty assignment management information system is being implemented in 1990 to improve analysis capability and to help monitor the achievement of requirements and objectives established by statute or DOD policies.

Questions on how to select officers for the Joint Specialty Officer billets, how to ensure joint professional military education requirements are met, how to monitor promotion criteria, how to integrate various military occupational specialty career paths into the joint program, and how to keep track of the Joint Specialty Officers subsequent duty assignments are areas the services are currently grappling with.

Each of the services appear to be supportive of the intent of the law, which is primarily to improve the performance of officers in joint duty positions by establishing management procedures for their selection, education, assignments, and promotions. However, implementing the requirements of the legislation has proven to be more difficult. The Secretary of Defense's guidelines combined with service cooperation and feedback has led to several changes in the legislation (detailed in Chapter III). Service procedures for Joint Specialty Officer management and the impact of officer personnel assignment policies continue to be developed and adjusted.

The law governing joint officer personnel management, Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, is complex and presents some significant challenges to the military officer management process. Effectively balancing the educational requirements, joint duty assignments, and military occupational specialties with qualified personnel will require

detailed attention by the personnel assignment monitors/detailers and individual officers.

B. PURPOSE OF THESIS

The purpose of this thesis is to improve the methodology for selecting and managing Joint Specialty Officers. Matching career paths, occupational specialties, and joint duty assignments with qualified personnel will be a primary goal.

Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps personnel management procedures are evaluated and compared. Joint professional military education requirements, specific tour lengths, occupational skill requirements, operational requirements, and waivers are examined.

The leglislation mandates specific requirements for minimum joint tour lengths, critical joint duty assignments, joint specialty officers, joint professional military education, promotion rates, and other detailed requirements. The Services' procedures and policies to implement the various detailed requirements will be compared with legislative requirements. This comparison could be beneficial to future personnel management planning and policy implementation. Individual Joint Specialty Officers could also benefit by being selected, assigned, and managed in a more effective manner.

C. OUTLINE OF THESIS

Chapter II deals with the background leading to the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Chapter III describes Title IV, and details the legislative requirements for the Joint Duty Assignment List, selection of Joint Specialty Officers, and various criteria to ensure quality officers are assigned and continuity enhanced in the joint service arena.

Chapter IV explains the procedures used for:

1) Joint Professional Military Education selection;
2) Joint Specialty Officer nomination and selection; and
3) composition of the Joint Duty Assignment List.

The joint officer personnel management policies and procedures of the services are presented for comparison. Chapter V presents the analysis of the Joint Specialty Officer management process and JPME/JDA selection procedures. Chapter VI states the conclusions and recommendations for future joint officer personnel management. Chapter VI also provides suggestions and recommendations for further research.

II. GENESIS OF TITLE IV

A. OVERVIEW

A review of the historical basis for reforming the Department of Defense and a look at some of the issues leading to previous reorganization efforts will help to lay a firm foundation for understanding some of the current reorganization legislative details of Title IV. This thesis will focus on joint personnel management, but many of the services' organizational roots have been embedded through parochial idealogies and previous reorganization efforts. This chapter will review some of the background and historical events leading to the most recent studies on Defense Department reorganization and joint military operations.

Since the Department of Defense (DOD) was established in 1947, the need to have effective and cohesive armed forces able to conduct successful joint operations has been a constant goal and struggle. The current framework in which joint duty is developed is, in hindsight, an outgrowth of the structure that developed during and after World War II. The war experiences requiring closely coordinated and mutually supported operations by land, sea, and air forces provided the impetus to change the organizational structure of the United States Military. Along with organizational changes came personnel rquirements and adjustments--the need for more unification

of the separate armed forces, greater joint efforts, and the creation of a Joint Staff.

The Defense Department emerged from the reorganization of tne War Department and the Navy Department into one centrally managed organization. The military organizational structure continued to evolve over time. The National Security Act of 1947 was followed by a series of changes in the law, such as the 1949 amendments, and the reorganization efforts of 1953 and 1958. These reform initiatives were designed to strengthen the military advice given to the President, enforce organizational structure, and develop the Joint Staff. [Ref. 2:passim]

Several poorly coordinated military operations in the early 1980's and numerous reorganization proposals sparked Congress into action for developing a plan for reform. Increasing defense budgets, publicity of bureaucratic acquisition practices, failed military operations, and internal complaints of inefficiencies led to a series of investigations, hearings, and studies. Many findings eventually became subjects for debate and further investigations, many of which are incorporated in the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Many organizational and personnel changes were proposed and eventually formulated into law with the 1986 reform.

Although the DOD has often been adjusted and restructured, the reform and reorganization attempts have never been of the magnitude and depth included in the

Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. What began as a review and analysis of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) soon engulfed the entire DOD organization. The 1986 legislation became the most comprehensive review and recommendation package of reorganization DOD ever experienced.

B. THE BEGINNING OF THE JOINT STRUCTURE

Missions, money, and even individual service survival increased the tendency toward competitive rather than complementary service relationships. As the military institutions evolved, they deveoloped primarily into a land-based force and sea-based force with each attempting to establish independence and autonomy. As the national geo-political strategies changed, along with the development of air power and nuclear weapons, the competition between the services often intensified as they struggled for limited resources.

The Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps evolved independently into distinctly different organizations with separate missions, policies, and traditions. Cooperation was often victim of competition--competition for missions, roles, funding, and survival. Budget priorities, military missions, roles, and strategic and logistic emphasis were oriented in two primary directions: 1) land warfare and 2) maritime warfare. Developing a structure to effectively employ the armed forces in joint operations and planning would prove to be a continuous task.

1. World War II

Although some joint operations were conducted prior to World War II, this war first brought the aspect of joint operations to the forefront. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had a committee composed of the leaders of the British military services. When the United States and Great Britain planned to coordinate strategies and operations for the conduct of the war, President Franklin Roosevelt established the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). However, the formation of the JCS did not end service partisanship; consequently, both cooperation and coordination were slow in developing. The victories in Europe and Japan via land, sea, and air overshadowed the neophyte difficulties of joint operations encountered by the services.

Service partisanship and inadequate coordination resulted in many delays on critial issues during World War II. However, traditional service roles of land and sea warfare were the norm, and highly qualified leaders were in prominent positions throughout the war. General Eisenhower commanded Europe and Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur commanded separate theaters in the Pacific. Their advice and access to the decision making bodies of government, the legislative and executive branches, helped the U.S. plan towards victory. Strategic planning emphasized stopping Germany and supporting our allies in Europe first, then the Pacific theater. Despite the relative inefficiencies of

joint operations, many successful joint campaigns employing land, sea, and air forces led to victory in both Europe and Japan. The size of the armed forces approached four million people with a tremendous amount of equipment, ships, and added flexibility created by the war economy. The credibility of the service chiefs as trusted military advisors also began developing during the planning and combat operations of World War II.

2. Post World War II

Numerous studies were initiated after the war in an attempt to find a structure that would provide an effective, more efficient method of integrating and running the Department of Defense. There were some efforts to unify the military branches into one service with a separate branch for land, sea and air forces. The Army favored a highly integrated post-war military, but the Navy opposed that concept. The Air Force, then still part of the Army, was interested in becoming a separate service. The final result was the National Security Act of 1947 and the formation of the Department of Defense with three separate services.

This post-war Security Act was the first effort toward a different defense establishment, and the three separate Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force were formed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff was established as a permanent organization. The JCS served as the principal military advisors on military policy, organization,

strategy, and plans to the President and the Secretary of Defense. The 1947 Act also established the Joint Staff for JCS support and gave specific guidance to the JCS to:

1) prepare strategic and joint logistical plans for the services;

2) assign logistical responsibilities to the services;

3) establish unified commands in strategic areas where such unified commands are in the interest of national security;

4) formulate training and education policies for their services;

5) review major material and personnel requirements of the military forces. [Ref. 3: 138]

Several amendments were made to the National Security Act during the succeeding decades. The Office of the Secretary of Defense was strengthened in the 1949 National Security Act. Additionally, the JCS was designated as principal military advisor to the National Security Council; the chairman position of JCS was established; and the Joint Staff size increased from 100 to 210 officers [Ref. 3:138]. The Commandant of the Marine Corps was included in the JCS in 1952 for matters involving the Marine Corps.

The 1953 reorganization efforts gave the JCS Chairman more power over the predominately service-oriented Joint Staff personnel. The changes in 1953 gave the Chairman additional authority to approve appointment and tenure of the Joint Staff and to manage the work of the Joint Staff. Responsibility for the conduct of operations

was transferred to the Unified commanders. Movement toward a more unified, coordinated Department of Defense and away from individual service parochialism led to many of the modifications, adjustments, and restructuring in the DOD.

The last major reorganization effort came in 1958. President Eisenhower declared to Congress that "separate ground, sea and air warfare is gone forever .... we must be prepared to fight as one, regardless of service. [Ref. 3:139]"

Congress subsequently passed the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. The Act:

1) removed the individual secretaries of the military departments from the chain of command;

2) insured the JCS could only act under the authority of the Secretary of Defense;

3) gave the Chairman of the JCS a vote in deliberations;

4) transfered control of the Joint Staff to the Chairman;

5) increased the size of the Joint Staff from 210 to 400 officers;

6) organized the JCS staff into numbered directorates of a conventional military staff [Ref. 3: 139].

These 1958 changes shifted command of U.S. military forces directly to the combatant commanders. The corporate structure of the JCS remained that of a committee seeking unanimity for resolving issues. No other major reorganizational efforts occurred after 1958 until the 1980s The structure was modified in 1967 when the service chiefs

terms were increased from two to four years. The Commandant of the Marine Corps was made a full member of the JCS in 1978. Table I is a listing of most of the major studies and changes to the Department of Defense that have occurred. The post-World War II and the post-Vietnam War time periods sparked the most interest and activity for evaluations and studies.

In sum, a multitude of changes have occurred in the Department of Defense and the development of the joint structure. Many of the adjustments and restructuring efforts have improved the efficiency of the organizations within the DOD. The role of the JCS has developed and matured to become a critical military advisor for the President, Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council. The foundation for the Joint Staff has been laid. The organization, as a whole, has improved. However, there are still deficiencies as demonstrated during the ill-fated Iranian hostage rescue attempt and the Grenada operation. The next two sections will address these deficiencies and detail the current reform initiatives that led to the 1986 Reorganization Act.

C. RECENT JOINT OPERATIONS

A brief look at two recent joint operations will help to show why concern was again raised on how to reform the Department of Defense and, specifically, joint operations.

Table I STUDIES AND PLANS ON DEFENSE REFORM [Ref. 3:141]

April 1945	Special Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee Report on Reorganization of National Defense
Sept. 1945	Eberstadt Committee Report
Oct. 1945	Collins Plan
April 1946	Thomas Bill
Jan. 1947	Army-Navy Compromise Plan (Norstad-Sherman Plan)
Feb. 1947	President Truman's National Security Act of 1947
Nov. 1948	Eberstadt Committee (of the Hoover Commission) Report
Feb. 1949	Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (Hoover Commission) Report
March 1949	Tydings Bill
April 1953	Rockefeller Committee Report
April 1953	President Eisenhower's Reorganization Plan
June 1953	Hoffman Plan
Jan. 1958	Wheeler Committee Report
April 1958	President Eisenhower's Reorganization Plan
Dec. 1960	Symington Study on Reorganization of the Department of Defense
July 1970	Blue Ribbon Defense Panel (Fitzhugh) Report
June 1978	Ignatius Report on Defense Reorganization
July 1978	Steadman Committee Report on National Military Command Structure
Feb. 1979	Defense Resource Management (Rice) Report
Sept. 1979	National Security Policy Integration Report
Dec. 1981	Joint Planning and Execution Steering Committee Report
Feb. 1982	Two separate reports of the Chairman's (of the JCS) Special Study Group
Feb. 1982	General Jones's Reorganization Proposal
April 1982	General Meyer's Reform Proposal
Aug. 1983	House Armed Services Committee Reorganization Proposals for the JCS
1983	Krulak (U. S. Strategic Institute) Study
1983	Byron (National War College Strategic Studies) Study
April 1984	Senate Armed Services Committee Study on the JCS and DOD
Sept. 1984	Hudson Institute Committee Report on Civilian-Military Relationships
Nov. 1984	DOD Review of JCS Reorganizational Proposals
Feb. 1985	Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies Report
Nov. 1985	Moses (National Defense University National Security Essay) Study
Oct. 1985	Senate Armed Services Committee Staff Report on Defense Organization
June 1986	President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (Packard Commission)
Oct. 1986	Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986

1. The Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission

The aborted Iranian hostage rescue attempt was probably one of the most widely publicized joint operations in recent years. There were complex coordination problems in the planning, training, and execution of the rescue mission. The Staff Report states, "The most serious criticism of the organization of the rescue operation is the charge that all four services insisted on participating in the mission, even though the participation of all four was unnecessary or even harmful. In other words, each service demanded a piece of the action [Ref. 2: 361]."

Every service wanted to be represented in the rescue mission and that did not enhance cohesion and integration. An exercise that had Marine pilots flying Navy helicopters carrying Army troops supported by the Air Force appeared to be quite "Joint" oriented. However, the mix was considered a major contributing factor to the failure of the rescue attempt. The mission was aborted prior to the mishap that killed eight people. This joint operation did not have the dedicated assets in organizational structure and training to ensure success.

The Senate Armed Services Committee's Report, Defense Organization: The Need for Change, discussed inefficiencies in planning, training, and the organizational problems of the Joint Task Force. Future joint operations must involve the use of educated and capable

officers in the combined forces to assist in the development of planning and training of the Joint Task Forces.

2. Grenada

The joint operation on the island of Grenada in 1983 was successful despite organizational shortcomings. The operation, URGENT FURY, demonstrated recent major deficiencies in the Armed Forces ability to work jointly when deployed rapidly. Senator Sam Nunn stated, "A close look at the Grenada operation can only lead to the conclusion that, despite our victory and success, despite the performance of individual troops who fought bravely, the U.S. Armed Forces have serious problems conducting joint operations [Ref. 4:22]." Some of the senior commanders in all services reportedly displayed a lack of understanding about the capabilities, assets, and tactics of the other services. The lack of coordination, organization, and planning drew criticism and showed an inability to work joint operations from the primarily independent service's organizational structures [Ref. 2:363-370].

The Vice-Admiral responsible for the Joint Task Force had no Army personnel on his staff; only one general and two majors were assigned to his staff on an emergency basis. Furthermore, there was no unified ground commander on Grenada which caused some coordination problems. Additionally, the Military Airlift Command retained control over some Air Force aircraft. Communications difficulties between the services were linked to:

1) separate purchasing avenues for equipment,

2) incompatibility of equipment, and

3) procedural differences.

Airlift logistical support and limited coordination on priorities contributed to organizational deficiencies. The thrust of Title IV of Goldwater-Nichols is that increased joint professional military education, increased familiarity with the capabilities and limitations of other services, and increased experience with more joint planning and operations could have prevented some of these problems.

Poor organization for joint operations was listed as a primary causal factor for the planning, communication, and logistical difficulties. Multi-service participation in the planning of the operation could have identified many of the weaknesses. That coordination and planning did not occur. Logistical planning and support was inadequate--required vehicles, weapons, rations and equipment were not supplied. In fact, the Army created "a unique supply system because its existing supply channels proved too cumbersome" [Ref: 2:369].

The inability of the services to work together effectively is linked with how the services continue to operate independently, even at the level of Unified command. The Senate Armed Services Committee report concluded that the failure of the Joint Task Force Commander in Grenada to be familiar with Army and Air Force tactics and assets, and the failure of the senior Army

commanders to be aware of the problems of working with the Navy demonstrated the organization's faults and inability to work together [Ref. 2:370].

D. RECENT REORGANIZATION PROPOSALS

Air Force General and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the early 1980s, David Jones, and Army Chief of Staff, General Edward Meyer, were the catalysts for the latest DOD reform initiatives. Dissatisfaction with the way the JCS and the military were operating along with perceived and real inefficiencies led these top service representatives to voice their criticisms of the system. A series of independent civil and congressional studies on DOD reform were subsequently initiated. This section will review several key studies and initiatives that led to the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

1. General Jones' Reorganization Proposal

General David C. Jones' credentials for JCS criticisms were unmatched. He served on the JCS for eight years, as its chairman for four of those years, under four Presidents and four Secretaries of Defense. He had many joint tours and staff tours prior to his tenure on the JCS. He stated that "despite many studies that have periodically documented problems with this military committee system and made cogent recommendations for improvement, the system has been remarkably resistant to change [Ref. 5:62]." The General claimed that stepping aside from long standing

service positions and objectively assessing the joint system could provide a clearer direction for reform.

General Jones compared the JCS running the U.S. military to that of a conventional bureaucracy. He wrote:

> The Joint Chiefs of Staff, if viewed as the military board of a government corporation, would provide some striking contrast to organization and management principles followed in the private sector: [the] Board consists of five directors, all insiders, four of whom simultaneously head line divisions .... reports to the chief executive and a cabinet member .... [and is] supported by a corporate staff which draws all its officers from line divisions and turns over every two years .... Line divisions control officer assignments and advancements; there is no transfer of officers among line divisions .... Board meets three times a week to address operational as well as policy matters, which normally are first reviewed by a four-layered committee system involving full participation of division staffs from the start .... At 75% of the Board meetings, one or more of the directors are represented by substitutes .... If the Board can't reach unanimous agreement on an issue, it must--by law--inform its superiors .... At least the four top leadership and management levels within the corporation receive the same basic compensation, set by two committees consisting of a total of 535 members .... and any personnel changes in the top three levels (about 150 positions) must be approved in advance by one of the committees. [Ref. 5:62]

Despite this sarcastic look at the operations of the JCS, many improvements to the joint program were cited by General Jones. These improvements include:

1) development of a broader joint exercise program;

2) establishment of a Joint Deployment Agency to integrate deployment plans and activities;

3) revamping the joint education system;

4) organizational adjustments for better integration of the joint command, control and communication systems;

5) establishment of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force and others [Ref. 5:67].

General Jones divided the most serious deficiencies into two categories: personnel and organizational. He stated more time was needed to be dedicated to war-fighting capabilities and less on the intramural scramble for resources [Ref. 5:67]. He criticized the failure of the system, and the services, to adequately prepare officers for cross-service and joint experience. Limited incentives and rewards inhibited top quality officers from pursuing joint duty. Low tenure and high turnover in key positions contributed to the instability of the joint personnel structure. Inexperience with other services and the lack of senior officers experiencing Joint Staff work contributed to the limited joint knowledge base. Joint Staff officers were still primarily "service-oriented" and the influence of service parochialism often limited "joint" thinking.

The perception held by many was that the military services had historically not considered duty on the Joint Staff of the JCS, the staffs of the warfighting commands, and other similar joint organizations to be as important as duty within the services themselves. Therefore, the military departments had not assigned their best officers to joint duty. Congress believed that those officers that did serve well in joint organizations were not fairly recognized with rewarding assignments, promotions, and

educational opportunities. The result was that both their careers and their joint organizations suffered.

General Jones went on to write:

> Any institution that imbues its members with traditions, doctrines and discipline is likely to find it quite difficult to assess changes in its environment with a high degree of objectivity. Deep-seated Service traditions are important in fostering a fighting spirit, Service pride and heroism, but they may also engender a tendency to look inward and to perpetuate doctrines and thought patterns that do not keep pace with changing requirements. Since fresh approaches to strategy tend to threaten an institution's interests and self-image, it is often more comfortable to look to the past than to seek new ways to meet the challenges of the future. When coupled with a system that keeps Service leadership bound up in a continuous struggle for resources, such inclinations can lead to a preoccupation with weapon systems, techniques, and tactics at the expense of sound strategic planning.
>
> Furthermore, officers come from and return to their Services which control their assignments and promotions. The strong Service string thus attached to a Joint Staff officer (and to those assigned to the Unified Commands as well) provides little incentive,--and often considerable disincentive--for officers to seek joint duty or to differ with their Service position in joint deliberations. [Ref. 5:68]

The message is that the people being assigned to the Joint Staff have little incentive to be there and the military departments have not been sending many of their best people. Organizational difficulties encountered on the Joint Staff ranged from committee compromises to parochial politics of the individual services (since the "Service string" is still attached). The competition for scarce resources, including people, that are allocated to the services is forecast to increase as the resources become more constrained by budgetary cuts. Increasing the

longevity by increasing the tour lengths could help with strategic planning. Long range planning for fiscal resources, including a five-year budget plan, is often disrupted by urgent issues (i.e., Libya, Middle East, etc.).

General Jones proposed three specific areas that needed changes:

1) Strengthen the role of the Chairman of the JCS.

> The Chairman of the JCS should be the principal military advisor to the President. The Chairman should be authorized a deputy to assist in joint activities ensuring readiness, improving war planning, and managing the joint exercising of the combatant forces.

2) Limit Service Staff involvement in the joint process.

> The Joint Staff should provide advice on matters involving more than one service. The service staffs should advise service chiefs on service matters, but the Joint Staff should advise on joint issues. Service-centered interests should be limited by focusing the staffing more towards joint decisions.

3) Broaden the training, experience and rewards for joint duty.

> More officers should have more tours of duty in joint assignments during their careers, and they should be rewarded for doing so. Additionally, the joint education system should be expanded and improved [Ref. 5:72].

General Jones urged Congress to go beyond tinkering with the system and make some detailed changes. Congress eventually accepted the challenge and began four years of hearings, investigations, and reports that culminated in the 1986 Reorganization Act.

2. General Meyer's Reform Proposal

Army General Edward C. Meyer followed General Jones' proposal and advocated even stronger organizational reform measures. General Meyer also identified three major problem areas for reform:

1) Dual-hatting for top Service positions needed to be reduced.

Dual-hatting or divided loyalty impairs the ability of top service leaders to provide sound, usable, and timely military advice to civilian leadership.

2) Include operational planning in the resource allocation process.

Operational plans need to be incorporated into the resource allocation and determination process. Combatant commanders need to be included in the determination of needs and requirements.

3) Combatant commanders' roles need to be strengthened.

The commanders must be involved in the defense decision-making process for their theater of operations [Ref. 6:88].

General Meyer's proposals state that tinkering with the system will not suffice. The issues of providing a structure to insure that civilian leaders receive the best and most usable military advice possible, and ensuring the organization is structured to work in wartime are important. Ensuring commanders are given sufficient guidance and resources to do operational planning for future joint contingencies are also critical. Evaluating these types of organizational changes should improve the overall function

of the DOD organizations and the JCS structure. [Ref. 6:90]

3. JCS Reorganization Act of 1983

General Jones' and General Meyer's proposals led to legislative inquiries into the structure and organization of the JCS. House Report 3718 proposed several legislative changes to the structure and operation of the JCS. The role of the Chairman of the JCS and various personnel problems were addressed in the House legislation, but the Bill was never voted on in the Senate and faded away [Ref. 3:140]. Improving joint operations and removing the difficulties encountered from multi-command chains remained a principle goal of various reorganization efforts.

4. Senate Armed Services Committee Report

Meanwhile, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) and Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) continued their inquiries, hearings, and investigations of the JCS and DOD structure. The SASC distributed a staff report in 1985, Defense Organization: The Need for Change, which left little about the Defense Department organization untouched.

The 1985 SASC conducted its investigation and held hearings that included hundreds of top DOD officials. The SASC reported an imbalance between service and joint interests. There was no clear policy making level present in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the Military Departments. Additionally, national

strategic goals were not clearly addressed. A predominance of service interests over joint interests within DOD was cited as a problem of balance, which has precluded the most efficient allocation of Defense resources. Specified and Unified Commanders appeared more concerned about their piece of the budget pie than in helping to formulate stratedy for their area of concern. Therefore, national strategic goals were unclear because of inattention to strategic planning. Bureaucratic red tape and inadequate quality of personnel assigned to Joint Staff positions were also identified as problem areas. The SASC investigations and hearings disclosed that part of the joint coordination problems were caused by the services placing inexperienced officers on Joint staffs and a high turnover rate for officers assigned to the staffs. [Ref. 2:passim]

In all, the SASC report included 91 recommendations for changes. Many of the recommendations were included in the 1986 Reorganization legislation. Noteworthy recommendations included:

1) Strengthen the role of the Chairman of the JCS;
2) Strengthen the role of the Combatant Commanders;
3) Establish the Vice-Chairman of the JCS position;
4) Formulate strategic planning policy procedures;
5) Give more autonomy to the Unified and Specified Commanders;
6) Establish Joint Specialty Officer Programs; and
7) Establish Professional Military Education guidelines. [Ref. 2: passim]

The growing concern over military capability led to these discussions and debates about potential changes to "fix" the military system. Congress, in its strong desire to push joint operations and cooperation, implemented several specific detailed legislative requirements in the Reorganization Act. The 1986 Reorganization Act unanimously passed the Senate on May 7th with a 95-0 vote. The House vote was 406-4 on August 5th. The House and Senate Conference Committee met August 13-September 11 to resolve differences, and on September 16th and 17th legislation was agreed to in the Senate and House, respectively. President Reagan signed the Reorganization Act into law October 1, 1986. [Ref. 7:7-8]

E. SUMMARY

The increased trend toward centralization in DOD functions, supported by the large body of academic work and coupled with a stream of military failures (i.e., Iranian hostage rescue attempt, Grenada) served to bring the issue of military reform to critical mass in the mid-1980's. Title IV is only a small but strategic part of the Reorganization Act, as Congress attempts to correct perceived and real inter-service coordination problems within the DOD.

Many of the above listed studies and proposals focused on weaknesses or deficiencies of the DOD. These weaknesses do not imply that the DOD is completely inefficient. Indeed, many functions and operations in the DOD are unparalleled in excellence and mission accomplishments.

The purpose of this background was to review the direction and context of many organizational and personnel changes that have occurred since World War II. The next chapter details the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, focusing on Title IV, Joint Officer Personnel Policy. The requirements of the 1986 law will be outlined along with amendments from 1987, 1988, and 1989.

III. THE LAW AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION

A. OVERVIEW

This chapter details the requirements of Title IV to show the scope of the joint personnel management problem. First, an overview of the key provisions of Title IV are presented. Next, the major sections of chapter 38, United States Code Title 10, created by the Reorganization Act are described to show the detailed requirements for implementing the legislation. The final section describes implementation progress by summarizing several previous studies conducted on the joint duty assignment list and the impact of Title IV on joint personnel management.

B. KEY PROVISIONS OF TITLE IV

Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 created a special category of officers for joint duty assignments, the Joint Specialty Officer (JSO). The education, training, and designation of these Joint Specialists are designed to strengthen the joint expertise placed in field grade and general/flag grade officer billets. The goal of Title IV is "to improve the performance of officers in joint duty positions by establishing management procedures for their selection, education, assignment and promotion [Ref. 1:2]." However, certain provisions of the legislation must be discussed to understand their significance to the joint officer personnel management and assignment difficulties.

The Reorganization Act requires the Secretary of Defense to select officers for the joint specialty with the advice and consent of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It further requires the military departments to nominate qualified officers for selection as Joint Specialty Officers (JSO). Under the requirements of the law, officers nominated for the joint specialty may not be selected until they successfully complete an appropriate program at a Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) school and successfully complete a full tour of duty in a Joint Duty Assignment (JDA).

1. Joint Professional Military Education (JPME)

One of the JSO requirements stipulated that an officer be educated in joint matters. To meet this requirement, the law mandates (with certain exceptions) that officers receive JPME and then serve in a joint tour prior to their designation as a JSO. JPME credit was originally obtained at only three colleges--the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National War College, and the Armed Forces Staff College. This limitation created a problem for the services because the law also required that one-half of the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) be filled by a JSO or JSO nominee. The services protested that the number of school seats available at the three schools would not be adequate to ensure compliance with the requirement to fill fifty percent of the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) with Joint Specialists. Consequently, the

intermediate level and senior level service school syllabi were modified to provide a joint track alternative to the normal service-oriented syllabus and increase the number of officers becoming eligible for JSO designation.

The currently evolving JPME system results from the Department of Defense's desire to improve understanding of joint matters and to meet the specific requirements of the law. Congressional interest in JPME has increased as a result of Representative Ike Skelton's detailed study on the military education system [Ref. 8].

Representative Skelton's study detailed many recommendations, including a two-phase JPME program that has since been incorporated into the Title IV legislation by amendment. Phase I is conducted at the service intermediate and senior level schools and Phase II at the Armed Forces Staff College. The Phase I education will still focus on service-oriented education and operational skills, but a major shift in the emphasis toward Joint Operations and interservice coordination will be taught. The student loading from each military service department has been adjusted to ensure better representation from each service branch for the seminars and classes. The faculty of each school should also represent each military department to improve the "joint" perspective of the educational courses. The Phase II program is similarly adjusted for student and faculty representation. Phase II is designed to be taught in a three month program of

temporary duty. Furthermore, Phase II is not intended to repeat the learning principles and objectives found in Phase I. [Ref. 8]

Congress, realizing that the services could not meet the letter of the law immediately in qualifying officers as Joint Specialty Officers, established a two year transition period in which the Secretary of Defense could waive certain prerequisites for designating JSOs. This authority allowed the Secretary to waive either the requirement for JPME or the full JDA tour requirement, but not both. The Fiscal Year 1989 Defense Authorization Act authorized an extension of the transition period for an additional year. Balancing the unique requirements of the law, providing JPME to the officer corps, and meeting the wishes of Congress presents a great challenge to the services joint personnel managers.

2. **Joint Duty Assignment (JDA)**

A Joint Duty Assignment involves:

> assignment to a designated position in a multi-Service or multinational command or activity that is involved in the integrated employment or support of the land, sea, and air forces of at least two of the three Military Departments. Such involvement includes, but is not limited to, matters relating to national military strategy, joint doctrine and policy, strategic planning, contingency planning, and command and control of combat operations under a unified command. [Ref. 9: II-1]

The Secretary of Defense, in close cooperation with the Joint Staff and the services, is required to publish a list of Joint Duty Assignments and identify those that are

critical joint duty assignments. The size and composition of the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) is the primary determinant of the services' ability to meet the exacting requirements of the law. The need to develop a JDAL that provides adequate opportunity with respect to general/flag officer grade qualification has resulted in the present list of approximately 8,900 JDA positions. Table II shows the distribution of billets for 1990 with the majority of JDA billets being assigned to the O-5 (lieutenant colonel/commander) grades. The size of the JDAL has remained fairly constant and has maintained a consistent distribution of billets to each branch despite numerous adjustments to the individual billets.

TABLE II 1990 JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENT LIST BY SERVICE AND RANK

	RANK					
SERVICE	O4	O5	O6	O7-O10	TOTAL	PERCENTAGE
ARMY	1120	1404	618	97	3239	36
NAVY	620	765	404	66	1855	21
AIR FORCE	1222	1300	640	93	3315	37
MARINE CORPS	185	216	73	15	489	6
TOTAL	3147	3745	1735	280	8907	100

Source: J-1, Joint Staff

The JDAL is a critical factor in the personnel management of joint duty assignments because some billets

require specific occupational skills, service affiliations, and ranks. Personnel management hinges on assigning top quality people in the billets designated for joint duty credit on the JDAL. The billets are further categorized as either joint or joint critical billets.[1] Table III shows the distribution of critical billets. The number of critical billets are 192 for the Navy, 390 for the Army, 381 for the Air Force, and 62 for the Marine Corps.

TABLE III 1990 JOINT DUTY CRITICAL BILLETS BY SERVICE AND RANK

	RANK				
SERVICE	O5	O6	O7-O10	TOTAL	PERCENTAGE
ARMY	185	186	19	390	38
NAVY	74	104	14	192	19
AIR FORCE	187	175	19	381	37
MARINE CORPS	30	29	3	62	6
TOTAL	476	494	55	1025	100

Source: J-1, Joint Staff

relative percentages for each service for critical billets are comparable to the percentages of the JDAL billets for each military department.

[1]Critical billets are positions for which it is highly important that the assigned officer be trained in and oriented toward the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces.

3. Joint Specialty Officer (JSO)

One of the key aims of the Title IV legislation was to establish a joint duty specialty that would provide highly qualified officers for multiple joint tours. The Joint Specialty Officer was created to achieve this goal. A JSO is an officer who is "educated and experienced in the employment and support of Unified and Combined forces to achieve national security objectives [Ref. 9:III-1]." Additionally, JSOs are to provide continuity for joint matters and act as mentors within the joint arena and their own services.

As indicated earlier, the law requires that one-half of the billets on the JDAL be filled by a JSO or JSO nominee. Consequently, the individual military departments began holding selection boards for Joint Specialty Officers in 1987 to determine the initial cadre of joint specialists. It currently takes about four years (three years for a critical occupational specialty) for an officer to qualify as a joint specialist because of the JPME and JDA completion requirements. To become a JSO nominee, an officer must have partially completed the prerequisites for designation as a JSO.

The legislation has given some relief to the critical war-fighting specialties, defined as Critical Occupational Specialty (COS). These occupations are shown in Table IV. Officers with critical occupational specialties may be nominated for the joint specialty by

either attending JPME or being assigned a Joint duty assignment; the sequencing of JPME and JDA may be reversed

TABLE IV CRITICAL OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES BY SERVICE

US ARMY	US NAVY
Infantry	Surface
Armor	Submarine
Field Artillery	Special Operations
Air Defense Artillery	Aviation
Aviation	SEALs
Special Operations	
Combat Engineers	
US AIR FORCE	**US MARINE CORPS**
Pilot	Infantry
Navigator	Tracked Vehicles
Operations Management	Artillery
Air Weapons Director	Aviation
Missile Operations	Engineers
Space Operations	Air Support/Air Control/ Anti-Air Warfare

Source: JCS Admin PUB 1.2

for COS officers. Additionally, instead of the required 3 year tour, a COS officer may fill a JDA billet for only 2 years and still receive joint duty credit. The purpose of this is to help ensure that critical operational and war-fighting skills are not adversely affected and to prevent personnel shortages in operational units.

4. Joint Duty Tour Length

The law initially called for joint tours of three years for general/flag officers and three and a half years

for field grade officers. This created many conflicts with Service officer assignment policies and reduced flexibility for managing personnel assignments. Service criticism led to legislative changes that lowered the minimum tour lengths to two and three years, respectively. Additionally, several provisions have been enacted that allow officers who have a critical occupational specialty to serve an initial joint tour that is less than the mandated two years.

5. Promotions

Another key provision of Title IV involves details regarding promotion policies. The law states that the Secretary of Defense will ensure the qualifications of officers assigned to joint duty assignments are such that officers who have served on the Joint Staff or who are JSOs will be promoted at a rate at least equal to their military department's headquarters average. Similarly, officers who have served in other type of JDAs are expected to be promoted at a rate at least equal to their service's average.

This provision was not to force increased promotions for JSOs, but rather to ensure that JSOs selected are sufficiently qualified to maintain promotion rates comparable to headquarters staffs and other officers.

The Secretary of Defense is required to furnish to the secretaries of the military departments promotion board guidelines for the purpose of ensuring appropriate

consideration of joint duty. Each selection board must consider officers who are serving in, or have served in, joint duty assignments and include at least one officer designated by the CJCS who is currently serving in a joint duty assignment. The CJCS will review the report of each selection board for the purpose of determining if the selection board's actions were consistent with joint duty consideration guidelines. This review is to ensure appropriate consideration was given to the performance of officers who are serving or have served in joint duty assignments.

The law also requires, subject to waiver by the Secretary of Defense, that an officer may not be promoted to general or flag rank unless the officer has completed a joint duty assignment tour. An exemption until January 1994 is listed for Naval officers designated as qualified nuclear propulsion officers. The Secretary of Defense may waive the requirement for officers only on a case-by-case basis. If the waiver is given for the "good of the service", then the first duty assignment shall be in a joint duty assignment.

In addition, when an officer is recommended to the President for an initial appointment to lieutenant general or vice admiral, or for an initial appointment to the grade of general or admiral, the CJCS must submit to the Secretary of Defense an evaluation of the performance of

that officer as a member of the Joint Staff and in other joint duty assignments.

C. JOINT OFFICER MANAGEMENT

1. Major Sections of Title IV

Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act is entitled Joint Officer Management. Most of Title IV's legislation was incorporated into Chapter 38 of the United States Code, Title 10. This section will summarize the Title IV legislation and briefly discuss the three amendments from the 1988, 1989, and 1990 Authorization Acts.[2]

What follows is a brief summary of the major sections of Title IV, Joint Officer Management:

661 - Management Policies for Joint Specialty Officers

662 - Promotion Policy Objectives for Joint Officers

663 - Education

664 - Length of Joint Duty Assignments

665 - Procedures for Monitoring Careers of Joint Officers

666 - Reserve Officers not on the Active Duty List

667 - Annual Report to Congress

The scope and complexity of Title IV becomes apparent when viewing the detailed requirements outlined in the law and its three subsequent amendments. In fact,

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[2]The details of the legislation and amendments are available in Public Law 99-433, 100-180, 100-456, and 101-189.

Senator Sam Nunn (Democrat, Georgia) who succeeded Senator Barry Goldwater (Republican, Arizona) as SASC Chariman, said "the Senate would have to 'very carefully' monitor implementation of the new law", and added that "we may very well have to make some changes next year [1987]" [Ref. 11:21].

661 - Management Policies for Joint Specialty Officers

The Secretary of Defense is responsible for establishing policies, procedures, and practices for the effective management of officers who are particularly trained and oriented toward joint matters. These officers will be identified as joint specialists in addition to their primary military occupational specialty. An example of the identifications currently used by the Navy is shown in Table V. The Navy created Additional Qualification Designators (AQD) to track each officer's experience in joint matters. The eight AQDs used by the Navy essentially identify Joint Professional Military Education, Joint Duty Assignment, and occupational experience levels to assist with personnel assignment management.

The Secretaries of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps nominate officers for the Joint Specialty. However, the Secretary of Defense with the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff actually selects officers for the joint specialty. This section dictates

TABLE V NAVY JOINT SPECIALTY ADDITIONAL QUALIFICATION DESIGNATORS

JS1: Currently awarded for full joint professional military education to graduates of either the National War College or Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

JS2: Indicates full credit for completion of a joint duty assignment.

JS3: JPME JSO nominee. Has completed JPME. Has graduated from a full JPME institution or completed both Phase I and Phase II. Has been designated as a nominee for the purpose of filling certain billets on the JDAL.

JS4: COS JSO nominee. A Critical Occupational Specialist officer (not JPME graduate) who is designated as a nominee to be eligible for joint duty billets.

JS5: JSO. Has completed the JPME and joint duty assignment requirements of the law; selected by the annual Navy JSO selection board; designated by the Secretary of Defense.

JS6: Joint Equivalency Assignment credit. Prior to 1 October 1989, joint duty credit was given to fulfill requirement of having joint duty credit prior to promotion to O-7.

JS7: JPME graduate from Phase I. Phase I schools include all senior and intermediate level courses at the service colleges after January 1990.

JS8: JPME graduate from Phase II. Has graduated from Armed Forces Staff College after July 1990.

Source: "Perspective", September-October 1990 [Ref. 10:2]

that an officer "nominated for the joint specialty may not be selected for the joint specialty until the officer:

1) successfully completes an appropriate program at a joint professional military education school; and

2) after completing such program of education, successfullly completes a full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment.

Officers who have a critical occupational specialty (see Table III) involving combat operations may be nominated for the joint specialty when initially assigned to a joint duty assignment. Additionally, the Secretary of Defense is to ensure that approximately one-half of the joint duty assignments positions are filled at any time by officers who have the joint specialty or who have been nominated for the Joint Specialty. Not fewer than one thousand joint duty assignment positions shall be designated critical--meaning the officer in that position must be particularly trained in, and oriented toward, joint matters.

After January 1, 1994, <u>all</u> the critical joint billets must be filled by officers who qualify as joint specialists. The Secretary of Defense has the authority to waive many of the criteria throughout the Act for the "good of the service" and other reasons. Additionally, the Secretary is responsible for establishing career guidelines for the selection, military education, training, types of duty assignments, and such other matters considered appropriate for JSOs.

662 - Promotion Policy Objectives for Joint Officers

There are three basic criteria for promotion policy objectives:

1) Current and prior Joint Staff officers are expected, as a group, to be promoted to the next higher grade equal to or above the rate for officers of the same armed force in the same grade and competitive category as the headquarters staff of their armed force.

2) Joint Specialty Officers are expected, as a group, to be promoted not less than the rate of officers in the same grade and competitive category as the headquarters staff of their armed force.

3) Officers serving in joint duty assignments are expected, as a group, to be promoted to the next higher pay grade at a rate not less than the rate for all officers of the same force in the same grade and competitive category. Periodic reports to Congress are required for the promotional categories.

663 - Education

Section 663 requires officers selected for promotion to general and flag rank to attend a military education course designed specifically to prepare them to work with other armed forces. The Secretary of Defense, with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is to periodically review and revise the curricula of joint professional military education schools to enhance the education and training of officers in joint matters. The schools are to strengthen the focus on a) joint matters and b) preparing officers for joint duty assignments. Additionally, the schools will maintain

rigorous standards for the military education of Joint Specialty Officers.

Each Joint Specialty Officer who graduates from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and the National Defense University must be assigned to a Joint Duty Assignment for that officer's next duty. Additionally, a high proportion (greater than 50 percent) of the other officers graduating from the service JPME schools must also be assigned to joint duty for their next assignment.

664 - Length of Joint Duty Assignments

This section legislates that general officers joint duty assignments shall not be less than 2 years (originally 3 years) and other officers joint duty assignments shall not be less than 3 years (originally 3 1/2 years). Again, the Secretary of Defense has waiver authority. Officers categorized with Critical Occupational Specialties (see Table III) may be assigned less than 3 years, but not less than two years.

Officers that retire, are released from active duty, suspended, or reassigned to other qualified positions may be excluded from calculating tour lengths averages used for reporting progress to Congress. Additionally, shorter overseas tours and subsequent joint duty assignment tours are not included. Services may only exclude 12.5 percent of all joint duty assignments for COS tours.

665 - Procedures for Monitoring Careers of Joint Officers

The Secretary of Defense will establish procedures for overseeing the careers of officers with the joint specialty and officers assigned in joint duty assignments. The Joint Staff will monitor the promotions and career assignments of officers with the joint specialty and officers assigned in joint duty assignments. Additionally, the Joint Staff will advise the Chairman on joint personnel matters.

666 - Reserve Officers not on the Active-duty List

Policies for reserve officers not on the active-duty list will be established by the Secretary of Defense similar to the policies for the active forces. Personnel policies will emphasize education and experience in joint matters for the reserve officers.

667 - Annual Report to Congress

This section of the law requires the Secretary of Defense to include joint duty information in his annual report to Congress. The report will include information not only from the Department of Defense, as a whole, but also separately for the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. The Secretary of Defense will include in the annual Report of the Secretary to Congress a detailed report on the implementation of Title IV. The Appendix is a copy of the 1990 report to the Congress. A brief summary of some of the required report items is included below:

1) the number of officers selected for the joint specialty and their education and experience.

2) the critical occupational specialties and identification of those for which there is a severe shortage of trained officers.

3) The above zone, in zone, and below zone promotion rates for officers on the Joint Staff, Joint Specialty Officers, officers serving in joint duty assignments, all officers, and officers serving on the service headquarters staffs.

4) Average tour length of duty in joint assignments for:

   a) general and flag officers, and
   b) other officers.

   Both categories shown separately for the Joint Staff and other JDAs.

5) The number of times and categories waiver authority was exercised.

6) Analysis of critical positions not filled by JSOs by:

   a) organization,
   b) explanation of reasons positions were not filled with joint specialists, and
   c) percentage of critical joint duty positions filled by JSOs.

2. 1987 Amendments (Public Law 100-180)

The "National Defense Authorizatin Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989" contained five sections with amendments related to Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act. The Sections are:

1301. Nomination and selection of officers for the joint specialty.

1302. Joint duty assignment positions.

1303. Length of joint duty assignments.

1304. Notice to Congress of use of waiver authorities and exclusions with respect to officer management.

1305. Special transition rules for nuclear propulsion officers.

These amendments further define criteria for designation of Critical Occupational Specialties, the Secretary of Defense waiver authority, minimum Joint Duty Assignment tour length requirements, and detailed exclusions from tour length calculation, and joint duty credit for reporting purposes. The services' ability to fill fifty percent of the Joint Duty Assignment positions with Joint Specialists was broadened by allowing JSO nominees to fill positions. Several additional reporting requirements were added to include categories of COS officers nominated and qualified for the Joint Specialty and comparing promotion rates above zone, in zone, and below zone for several categories of officers. Additionally, detailed transitional plans for nuclear propulsion officers were outlined with the Title IV transition period extended until 1992 for nuclear qualified officers. [Ref. 12]

3. 1988 Amendments (Public Law 100-456)

The "National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989" has nine sections on Joint Officer Personnel Policy. The sections are:

511. Waiver authority with respect to selection of officers for the joint specialty.

512. Joint specialty officers in critical joint duty assignments.

513. Promotion policy objectives for officers with the joint specialty.

514. Length of joint duty assignments.

515. Additional transition provisions for implementation of prerequisite for promotion to initial flag and general officer grade.

516. Extension of transition to joint duty assignment staffing requirements.

517. Counting of officers with critical occupational specialty involving combat operations for purposes of joint duty assignment staffing and tour lengths.

518. Service by captains and Navy lieutenants in joint duty assignment to be counted for all officer personnel laws concerning such service.

519. Technical amendments.

One of the most influential amendments was section 514. This amendment changed the JDA tour length requirement from three and one-half years to three years, and from three years to two years for flag/general officers. Section 515 extended the nuclear qualified officers transition for two more years--until 1994. The Title IV implementation transition period for all military departments was extended until October 1, 1989 by section 516. The other sections clarified or adjusted other provisions of Title IV to help with determining categories or eligibility and reporting requirements. [Ref. 13]

4. 1989 Amendments (Public Law 101-189)

The "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991" included legislation on Joint

Professional Military Education (JPME). Section 1123 of this Act discusses "Professional Military Education in Joint Matters". Professional Military Education improvements were lauded and the two-phase approach to JPME was outlined here. The Statement of Congressional Policy, Section 1123(b) explained the sequenced approach to joint education and emphasized the requirement to complete Phase I education prior to Phase II. Furthermore, reporting requirements were included as oversight measures to ensure compliance with the two-phase JPME sequencing. [Ref. 14]

D. IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS

Each of the military departments has taken steps to integrate and implement the Title IV requirments into their career planning and officer assignment procedures. Since the enactment of the law, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has published several policy guidance memoranda and is currently working on a comprehensive DOD directive. Several memoranda have been issued to provide policy guidance for the Services to help them begin implementing requirements of the legislation. The Joint Staff has also published JCS Admin Pub 1.2, "Joint Officer Management", to describe the law and implementation policy guidance. A soon to be published study on Joint Officer Management was conducted by the Joint Staff, with the cooperation and assistance of each of the military departments. Additionally, a Joint Duty Assignment Management Information System (JDAMIS) has been established for data

collection to ensure compliance and to meet the various Congressional reporting requirements. JDAMIS, which is scheduled to be functional in 1990-1991, is currently being tested and evaluated for validity.

The General Accounting Office (GAO), at the request of Congress, has conducted several reviews of various aspects of the impact or implementation of Title IV. Reviewing the research areas and their results helps to evaluate how Title IV is being implemented by the Services.

In June 1988, the GAO produced a Congressional briefing report entitled, "Impact of Joint Duty Tours on Officer Career Paths." The report had been generated in response to DOD legislative proposals to Title IV to modify tour lengths. The report compared the various lengths of time officers spent in key "war-fighting positions"[3] and "non-war-fighting positions". The report attempts to determine if an officer's career path has enough "non-war-fighting position" time to accomodate joint tours. The results state that Navy and Marine officers in field grades spend an average of 8.2 out of 16 years and 9.6 out of 15 years in "non-war-fighting positions", respectively. Consequently, the conclusion was that there is enough time to do a 4.5 year JPME/JDA tour. [Ref. 15:passim]

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[3]War-fighting positions are defined as follows: Army--division, brigade, battalion, and company level assignments; Air Force--wing and squadron level assignments; Marine Corps--fleet marine force assignments; and Navy--sea duty and major shore commands.

Army and Air Force officers spend less time in "non-war-fighting positions" as shown in Table VI.

This comparative table shows that the Army and Air Force field grade officers are most pressed to accomodate joint tours. The Air Force had the lowest amount of time in non-war-fighting assignments (averaging 6.3 years) followed by

TABLE VI FIELD GRADE EXPERIENCE OF GENERAL OFFICERS (FIGURES IN AVERAGE YEARS)

CATEGORY	ARMY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE	NAVY
War-fighting assignments	6.0	5.4	6.6	7.8
Non-war-fighting assignments	7.6	9.6	6.3	8.2
Field grade total	13.6	15.0	12.9	16.0
Maximum period of consecutive non-war fighting assignments	3.9	5.2	3.4	2.6

Source: GAO report of June 1988, "Impact of Joint Duty Tours on Officer Career Paths" [Ref. 11:5]

the Army (averaging 7.6 years). The report does not address, however, what the effect might be on community career path structures. Further analysis by community data could be conducted to determine if a deterioration of war-fighting skills or operational shortages would result from the 3 to 4 years required for completing JPME and JDA. [Ref. 15:passim]

In April 1989, the GAO produced a congressional briefing report entitled "Implementation Status of Joint Officer Personnel Policies". This report examined:

1) the quality of officers assigned to joint duty,
2) the quality of officers selected for the Joint Specialty,
3) the achievement of promotion targets,
4) the application of the Reorganization Act to reservists,
5) career guidance, and
6) efforts undertaken to meet reporting requirements.

[Ref. 16:8]

The results found that the level of progress in implementing Title IV varied. Generally, quality officers were being selected as Joint Specialists and assigned to joint duty. However, quality differed by grade and service. The quality of the Air Force and Navy officers was criticized. Quality was defined by using indicators commonly used by the services to identify high potential officers. This included completion of intermediate and senor service schools, selection for command, and promotion at a faster than normal rate. [Ref. 16:passim]

The services were not consistently meeting promotion targets established by the Act. Shortfalls were common for promotion to Colonel/Navy Captain, and DOD expressed concern that these shortfalls may be attributed to assignment practices that occurred prior to the Reorganization

Act. The issue of Title IV's application to reservists had not been addressed yet by the Secretary of Defense or the Service branches.

The military departments have put a lot of effort and energy into meeting Title IV requirements and integrating the law into manpower management procedures. Although no formal directives had been published at that time, the services have updated career handbooks and the DOD has issued career guidance memoranda. The services have devoted considerable effort developing data systems to meet reporting requirements established by Title IV. The services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense indicated that reporting efforts were extensive and costly, estimating $500,000 to develop the JDAMIS data base. Furthermore, the report stated "... service data indicate they have expended over 50,000 manhours at a cost of a little over $1 million to implement the reporting requirements of the Reorganization Act. [Ref. 12:22]"

The DOD Joint Duty Assignment List was reviewed in a February 1990 GAO report to determine:

1) whether its positions provided the experience required by the Goldwater-Nichols Act,

2) how DOD designated critical positions, and

3) if some non-designated positions in the military departments provide experience in the integrated employment of forces [Ref. 17:10].

GAO sampled the designated joint duty positions and found that 60 percent of the operational agencies and 42 percent

of the positions sampled in support agencies provided joint operational experience. The study categorized JDAL positions into one of six categories based on structured interviews with incumbents in those positions and reviews of position descriptions. [Ref. 17]

This study concluded that many positions on the JDAL provide joint operational experience. Additionally, the study determined that many in-service, non-designated positions also provide experience in operational matters. DOD issued guidance that may result in some of these in-service positions being transferred to other services and added to the JDAL.

The joint officer management provisions were enacted as part of the reorganization of the Department of Defense which was intended to enhance the country's war-fighting capability. Implementation has been a slow and occassionally difficult process for the Secretary of Defense and the services. As these GAO reports have shown, progress is being made and serious efforts have been extended by the services to ensure implementation. More changes may need to be integrated as continued evaluation occurs to improve the joint officer system.

E. SUMMARY

This chapter has shown the complexity and detailed requirements of the Title IV legislation. Integrating the requirments of the law with the personnel management procedures and the needs of the military services has been

a challenge for the Armed Forces manpower planners. Adjusting to the recent changes involving Joint Professional Military Education is important for ensuring that Joint Specialist qualifications are met by the future leaders of the services. The efforts have been extensive by the Joint Staff, the military departments, and Congress to assist in improving the education and quality of officers assigned to joint duty. The next chapter will look at service specific procedures for the selection of officers for JPME and the Joint Specialty.

IV. SERVICE SELECTION PROCEDURES

A. OVERVIEW

This chapter outlines the individual service's procedures for Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) and Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) selection that will be used in the analysis of Title IV implementation. First, a brief discussion of several modeling tools will be presented. Next, the criteria and selection procedures for intermediate and senior service schools for JPME will be detailed. JSO nomination and designation procedures will then be presented along with the Joint Duty Assignment List distribution for each of the services. The chapter concludes with a discussion of using the Joint Duty Assignment Management Information System (JDAMIS) for tracking and reporting JSO and Joint Duty Assignment (JDA) management requirements.

B. CAREER PATHS AND MODELING TITLE IV IMPLEMENTATION

Several Naval Postgraduate School theses, a number of service-oriented studies, and a Center for Naval Analysis Study have examined the impact of various officer flows given the requirements of Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act. These flow models serve as tools for manpower managers to evaluate effects of various personnel changes, to forecast the impact of the legislation on warfare communities, and to assist by providing decision-making information for implementing and monitoring the

impact of Joint Duty Assignment and Joint Specialty Officer flows.

Professor Paul Milch (1988), the Naval Postgraduate School, designed a user-interactive personnel flow forecasting model, FORECASTER, to analyze the effects of Title IV on the personnel flow with respect to various career paths and warfare communities [Ref. 18]. This model has provided an excellent capability for conducting career path modeling and analysis. Johnson (1989) used FORECASTER to analyze the effect of the Goldwater-Nichols Act on the personnel flow within the Navy's Surface Warfare community. Johnson's results indicate the FORECASTER model can be used by community managers as an analytical tool to quantitatively analyze the impacts of policy changes and career paths [Ref. 19]. Drescher (1989) analyzed the flow within the Navy's Tactical Aviation Pilot and NFO career paths. Drescher concluded that completely fulfilling the requirements established by the Goldwater-Nichols Act would increase the number of back-to-back shore tours and lead to decreased war-fighting skills and operational readiness. Additionally, the ability of Tactical Aviation to fill its "fair share" of soft billets would be decreased if all requirements of Title IV were met. [Ref. 20]

Miller (1989) used an interactive computer program, TITLEIV, to demonstrate the usefulness of this computer model as an analytical tool for Marine Corps Manpower Managers. The TITLEIV model was used to provide answers to

"what if" questions concerning compliance with Title IV leglislation. Again, this computer model can be used as a management tool for analysis of the implementation of Title IV requirements and career path flows. [Ref. 21]

Cymrot's (1987) Joint Specialist Community Model was developed for Navy planners to help determine the effect promotion rates and shifts in Joint Duty Assignments for O-4, O-5, and O-6 grades have on the number of Navy O-6s eligible for promotion to O-7 (Flag Officer). This model used a LOTUS 1-2-3 spreadsheet format for fills and flow rates to develop scenarios for evaluating the impact of Title IV on various policy options. The analysis suggests that average billet length, number of National Defense University graduates, and the availability rate (the fraction of qualified personnel actually available to fill billets) are three factors that significantly affect the number of Joint Specialists produced. The effects of retention rates and promotion rates on Joint Specialists production were smaller. Results from Cymrot's analysis concluded that the model provides useful information for policy makers and planners to evaluate the effectiveness of meeting various Title IV requirements. [Ref. 22]

The strength of these models is their ability to help personnel managers determine macro level issues such as the ability of the services to meet the requirements of Title IV, the effects on personnel flows that various policy actions will cause, and the impact of flow models to

evaluate "what if" scenarios. Although the models used in these studies are useful tools for personnel managers to help forecast and evaluate Title IV effects they are not necessarily providing optimal forecasting solutions because they don't account for the criteria for selection and designation of officers to JPME and JDAs.

A key starting point for JSO designation is the nomination and selection criteria of officers to establish the flow through the Joint Speciality designation pipeline. (see Figure 1). Figure 1 shows the various paths towards JSO designation. The design is such that JPME should occur prior to the Joint Duty Assignment, but, as illustrated in Figure 1, alternative paths are feasible. A methodology for the selection and eventual designation and tracking of Joint Specialists is needed. The service's could be so involved and diligent in fulfilling the myriad requirements of Title IV that the right officers are not assigned to the correct billets at the appropriate time.

The 1990 Defense Authorization Act requires this two-phased approach to JPME. The two phases of JPME create several sequencing avenues towards designation of the Joint Specialty. Figure 2 illustrates the four primary paths of obtaining the JSO designation considering the two-phase JPME that began in 1990. The recommended sequence is for an officer to complete Phase I, followed by Phase II and a Joint Duty Assignment prior to JSO designation. For COS officers, the JDA-JPME sequence can be modified in two



Figure 1- Joint Specialty Officer Designation Flow Diagram



Figure 2- Primary Educational Sequencing for JSO Qualification

ways. First, a COS officer can be assigned to a JDA before Phase I and Phase II JPME. The second COS alternative sequence is direct entry into Phase II JPME, followed by JDA, and then Phase I JPME. The other JPME sequencing path is via completion of a Phase I correspondence course, followed by Phase II JPME, and then completing a JDA. Although the intent is for officers to first attend the joint education school, then serve in a Joint Duty Assignment, the alternative sequencing paths are designed to give to the personnel manpower managers more flexibility in making assignments.

The various models previously discussed exist for the analysis of managing the whole process of implementing the law; however, the individual officer, his qualifications, requirements, and career path are unique. For example, each service manages its officer career path assignments differently. The Army uses an Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) with eight divisions, five of which are directly concerned with officer development and assignments. These divisions are further divided into 23 branches which represent groupings of officers. The Navy's manpower management is centered with the Navy Military Personnel Command (NMPC). NMPC uses 19 primary branches for career path management and professional development paths, usually in well defined sea-shore sequences.

The Air Force Personnel Classification System is designed around career fields that place officers in

functional groupings based on similarity of skills required. Air Force Specialty Codes are also used to group designated specialists for manpower management purposes. The Officer Assignment Branch for the Marine Corps maintains three primary officer assignment departments. The personnel monitors of the Various Military Occupational Specialties make assignments. Some of these primary areas for officer assignments of each military department are further subdivided into specific warfare communities for personnel management. The role of the personnel managers is critical for duty assignments as timing, qualifications, tour lengths, tour types, and career paths all hinge on the assignment and selection process.

C. SELECTION FOR JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

Joint Professional Military Education is the gateway to Joint Specialty Officer nomination and selection. The transition period for Title IV waiver authority to waive the requirement for either JPME or JDA ended 1 October 1989. As discussed earlier, the selection and eventual designation of a Joint Specialist requires JPME followed by completion of a JDA. Officers with Critical Occupational Specialities (COS) can begin the JSO nomination process by being assigned to a JDA initially, and then attending JPME, but this is an exception to the preferred method of "growing a JSO". Additionally, the Secretary of Defense can waive the sequence on a case-by-case basis. The

intent, however, remains first to acquire the joint perspective from JPME, then serve in the JDA.

Phase I of JPME is taught as part of the resident curricula of the military Service's Intermediate Colleges or Senior Service schools (see Table VII for listing of schools). The resident Professional Military Education programs of the National Defense University (National War College and Industrial College of the Armed Forces) satisfy both Phase I and Phase II JPME requirements.

TABLE VII INTERMEDIATE AND SENIOR SERVICE SCHOOLS

Army Command and General Staff College (Ft. Leavenworth, KS)

Marine Corps Command and Staff College (Quantico, VA)

Air Command and Staff College (Maxwell AFB, AL)

College of Naval Command and Staff (Newport, RI)

Army War College (Carlisle, PA)

College of Naval Warfare (Newport, RI)

Air War College (Maxwell AFB, AL)

National Defense University:

- National War College (Washington, DC)
- Industrial College of the Armed Forces (Washington, DC)
- Armed Forces Staff College (Norfolk, VA)

The Armed Forces Staff College has been redesigned to be the only Phase II credit institution. The initial Phase II JPME class began in June 1990.

Professional Military Education is important to making a good service officer into a good joint-oriented officer. Service schools provide joint education from a service perspective and Joint Schools provide joint education from a joint perspective. Service schools goals are to increase the focus on joint operations and increase officer representation from each of the military branches. These goals emphasize the "socialization or bonding" as well as increase the exposure to the perceptions and views of officers from the other military departments. The education process is designed to help bridge the officer's thinking from a service perspective to a joint perspective.

Representative Ike Skelton (Missouri), chairman of the Study Panel on Military Education, commented on the Selection standards in a November 19, 1987 speech before Congress:

> ....Each service views professional military education in a different way. For the Army, attending intermediate and senior level military institutions is vital to the career of the individual officer. In a certain sense it is a ticket that has to be punched. The attitude of the Air Force is a somewhat different, less rigorous one. Though the service does send its best officers, the idea is one of education for education's sake. Traditionally, the Navy has thought it very important to select an officer to go off to school, be it the staff college or the war college level. While important for the individual officer to be selected, it was less important that he attend. The service viewed selection, not necessarily attendance, as the important consideration for career advancement. As a result, we have a number of captains and admirals in the Navy in key positions who have never been to either the intermediate or senior level course at the Naval War College. As for the Marine Corps, it seems to combine the attitudes of the Army and the Navy, an important ticket to be punched but not necessary for advancement.

> Yet it is important to make sure that since only a small percentage of the officer corps has the opportunity to attend the intermediate and senior service schools that only the best be admitted. ... [Ref. 23:H10649]

Skelton reviewed the Military Education programs for each of the military departments. One of the results from his panel's report was the revision of the "Military Education Policy Document". This May 1990 publication defines the objectives and policies regarding the educational institutions that make up the military education system of the Armed Forces. The "Military Education Policy Document" provides both objectives for all Professional Military Education (PME) programs and specific objectives for each level. The five levels of military education are precommisioning, primary intermediate, senior, and general/flag level. Each level's primary focus is designed to build upon previously gained knowledge. The impact of Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986) and the Skelton Report on Military Education (1989) are evidenced in the detail that Joint Professional Military Education is addressed. The entire Professional Military Education system is now designed as a sequence of educational goals and objectives that are progressive and enhanced at each level. [Ref. 24]

Each military department must select its PME students from among its most outstanding officers. In addition, each service must provide students from a variety of warfare occupations and specialties. The ratio of students

from each service should provide balance to enhance the joint educational experience at the service schools. Table VIII shows what the student distributions from each military department at the different schools were in 1987-1988. According to Table VIII the Army has almost 50 percent (1342 of 2885) of all intermediate school seats, the Air Force filled 864 seats, the Navy has 399 seats, and the Marine Corps used 270 seats. Each military service is

TABLE VIII COMPARISON OF JOINTNESS IN STUDENT ENROLLMENT (ACADEMIC YEAR 1987-1988)

SCHOOL	SERVICE				
	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE	USMC	TOTAL
Intermediate Level:					
Armed Forces Staff College	212	93	146	37	488
Army Command & General Staff	704	3	40	18	765
Naval Command & Staff	32	97	12	21	162
Air Command & Staff	44	13	384	9	450
Marine Corps Command & Staff	12	9	2	123	146
Senior Level:					
National War College	40	28	40	10	118
Industrial College of Armed Forces	63	40	62	10	175
Army War College	181	8	17	9	215
College of Naval Warfare	34	98	13	28	173
Air War College	20	10	148	5	183
Total	1342	399	864	270	2885

Source: Input from colleges [Ref. 8:76]

represented in each school; however, the Navy had only three and eight officers, respectively, attend the Army Intermediate and Senior level schools. Also, the Air Force

had two officers attend the Marine Corps school, and the Marine Corps sent a combined 14 officers to the Air Force schools. The National Defense University schools (National War College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and the Armed Forces Staff College) show better service representation which subsequently contributes to the development of their institution's educational joint perspectives.

Table IX compares, by service, the number of intermediate students with the total number of majors/Navy

TABLE IX OFFICERS IN INTERMEDIATE PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION (ACADEMIC YEAR 1987-1988)

SERVICE	Number of Intermediate PME Students	Total Number of Majors/Navy Lieutenant Commanders (O-4s)	Percentage Intermediate Students of Total O-4s
ARMY	1004	16,791	6.0
NAVY	215	13,614	1.6
AIR FORCE	584	19,615	3.0
MARINE CORPS	208	3,214	6.5

Source: Student numbers from schools. Number of majors/Navy lieutenant commanders from "DOD Military Manpower Statistics" September 30, 1988. [Ref. 8:114]

lieutenant commanders (O-4s) that attended intermediate service schools in 1987-1988. The Army sends the most students (1004) and the Marine Corps sends the highest relative percentage of students (6.5 percent) based on this

annual observation. Except for the Marine Corps, the Navy sends both fewer officers (215) and a lower percentage of officers (1.6 percent) to intermediate schools. Table IX also illustrates the rarity of the opportunity for O-4s to attend intermediate PME in 1987-1988 ranging from 1.6 percent of the Navy's O-4 population to only 6.5 percent for the Marine Corps. The Air Force sent only three percent and the Army only six percent of their O-4 population to intermediate school.

Although the opportunity to attend PME is a rare event, nearly 3000 U.S. Military officers were assigned to attend Professional Military Education at the Intermediate or Senior level in academic year 1987-1988 (see Table X). The Army clearly places a high priority on PME attendance with 1,342 officers receiving the opportunity to attend. Another item in Table X worthy of mention is that the Navy's attendance at senior schools (184 students) is almost equal to their intermediate school level (215 students). The Navy's senior school enrollment represents 46 percent of all PME seats filled by the Navy. All of the other services send far fewer officers to senior school than intermediate schools. The percentages of senior school fills relative to total PME fills are 338/1342 (25 percent) for the Army, the Air Force has 280/864 (32 percent), the Marine Corps has 62/270 (23 percent). These differences indicate an increased emphasis by the Navy on the importance of senior level schools.

1. PME Selection Processes

The selection process to choose and assign these officers is a critical component of the Joint Specialty designation process. A look at how each of the services select high quality officers to attend JPME is important. The intermediate level school is targeted to career

TABLE X ANNUAL PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION ENROLLMENT (ACADEMIC YEAR 1987-1988)

SERVICE	Intermediate School	Senior School	Total
ARMY	1,004	338	1,342
NAVY	215	184	399
AIR FORCE	584	280	864
MARINE CORPS	208	62	270
TOTAL	2,011	864	2,875

Source: Service Schools [Ref. 8:150]

officers with 10 to 14 years experience and the senior level is aimed at the officers with 15 to 23 years of experience. The variance among the service's selection and assignment process will now be examined.

ARMY - The Army promotion system regards the completion of professional military education as critical. Army officers are screened by a board of officers for selection to attend Professional Military Education. The Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel approves the

boards results. Assignment officers then send those officers selected to the appropriate intermediate school.

Attending intermediate or senior level school is perceived to be a prerequisite for increased rank in the Army structure. Promotability is, therefore, a key selection criterion. In fact, the Skelton Report stated that Army officers selected for intermediate PME were the top 40-50 percent of the majors. Similarly, the top 20 percent of lieutenant colonels and colonels were selected for senior level schools.

Majors not selected for intermediate PME must complete the Command and General Staff Officers Course by correspondence as a prerequisite for promotion to lieutenant colonel. Failure to complete the Command and General Staff College (resident or non-resident) virtually assures non-selection to lieutenant colonel for Army line officers. Additionally, the critical importance of senior service school attendance is evidenced by the Army's General officer's high correlation rate between General officers and senior school attendance. Almost all (98 percent) of the Army's serving generals had completed Senior service college.

Of all the services, the Army sends the most officers to both intermediate and senior PME. The importance of PME on an Army officer's career path makes selection highly competitive. Officer Personnel Management Directorate (OPMD) of the Army OPMS manages officer

assignments in the branch and functional areas. The OPMD assigns selected officers to attend PME using a priority distribution model. The PME graduates fill key positions in the Army structure, as well as Joint Duty Assignments. The promotion and JPME criteria of Title IV are easily integrated into the Army's PME selection and assignment process.

NAVY - Navy officer selection criteria for intermediate and senior professional military education is detailed in OPNAVINST 1301.8. Officers are selected to attend service college as an adjunct to the promotion board in which they are in-zone for lieutenant commander (Intermediate school) and commander (Senior school). In 1988, the Navy qualified 69 percent of the lieutenant commander selectees, 80 percent of the commander selectees, and 100 percent of the captain selectees for Professional Military Education. Th Navy reduces ratio of the number qualified to the number assigned by having Navy Personnel officers make assignment selections from the pool of eligible officers. Additionally, officers may be selected for Service college attendance by requesting administrative screening through their assignment detailers.

The Service College Selection Boards consider sustained superior performance as a primary criterion for selection. Selectees remain on the Service college selection list for several years and are assigned as students during appropriate times in their career paths.

The Navy has some unique difficulties in having its officers attend PME because of requirements to keep ships at sea, submarine safe, aviators qualified, and so on. Unlike the other services, the Navy operates in its war-fighting environment routinely and maintains a constantly high demand for top quality officers to fill many critical service billets. Furthermore, the Navy also has many officers attending graduate education programs at this juncture in their careers. This creates additional competition for high quality officers between JPME and the technical and non-technical graduate education needs.

Former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Trost, responded to the Skelton Study panel inquiry on the selection process with this summary:

> .... The personnel process which results in the assignment of officers to specific schools considers the officer's professional development needs, personal preferences and desires, billet requirements, personal credentials, career timing, Navy manning needs, and available quotas. We place great emphasis on the quality of our officers in the schools of the Sister Services. A flag officer approval is made of every nominee to attend service college. This assures a strong candidate is assigned to all our available quotas. ... [Ref. 25: 1308-1309]

AIR FORCE - The Air Force employs a three step selection process. First, eligibility to attend PME is determined from the promotion board selection process. Second, the promotion boards reconvene to determine the school nomination list. Approximately 32 percent of the majors and 15 percent of the lieutenant colonels are

nominated. The third step is selection by an intermediate or senior school designation board comprised of colonels and generals. The board decides PME school assignments based on the result of a complete review of the military records of the officers selected.

MARINE CORPS - Selection for intermediate and senior service school for Marine Corps officers is initiated by officer assignment monitors. Quality of performance and availability of transfer are key indicators for the monitors to recommend officers for intermediate schools. The Marine Corps Director of Personnel Management approves the selections. Intermediate service school assignments are recommended by the officer's assignment monitor.

Senior school selection, based on qualifications and availability, is competitive with all lieutenant colonel records screened for attendance. The results of the screening are reviewed and approved by the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

General Al Gray responded to the Skelton Study panel inquiry about selection criteria for the officers attending PME by stating:

> As to school assignments, the best officers available are selected to attend PME. The quality of an officer's record and his promotability are the principal criteria for assignment to PME. [Ref. 25: 1365]

A renewed emphasis on the study of war-fighting skills has been pushed by the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Therefore, enrollment in the appropriate Non-resident Professional Military Education course is now required for all officers.

D. JOINT SPECIALTY OFFICER NOMINATION AND DESIGNATION

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have issued policy guidance and implementation procedures about JSO nomination and designation procedures to the services via memoranda and the publication of JCS Admin Pub 1.2. A Joint Officer Management Program Directive is being completed by the Joint Staff detailing the policy guidance for implementing the provisions of Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Additionally, the Joint Staff, in cooperation with each of the military departments, is completing a study on joint officer management initiatives.

The transition period (1986-1989) contained many avenues toward the JSO designation with multiple exceptions, exemptions, and qualification criteria. The services have conducted JSO designation boards using the precepts and policy guidance the JCS memoranda established. The 30 September 1989 summary of officers awarded the JSO designation is presented in Table XI. The Army has qualified the most officers (6,660) and the Air Force has qualified the most General/Flag officers (309). The distribution shown in Table XI shows that the Army has 38 percent of the 17,489 designated JSOs, while the Army

composes 32 percent of the O-4 and above officers in DOD. The Navy's 3,708 JSOs represent 21 percent of the designated JSOs, but compose 26.3 percent of the DOD's field grade and above officers. The Air Force has 5,706

TABLE XI JOINT SPECIALTY OFFICER SELECTION AS OF 1 OCTOBER 1989

SERVICE	O-4 TO O-6	General/Flag Officers	Total
ARMY	6,455	205	6,660
NAVY	3,473	235	3,708
AIR FORCE	5,397	309	5,706
MARINE CORPS	1,345	70	1,415
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE	16,670	819	17,489

Source: Joint Staff, J-1

JSOs (33 percent of the 17,489) and they represent 37.3 percent of the DOD's officers. Finally, the Marine Corps' 1,415 JSOs represent eight percent of the JSO population and 5.5 percent of the DOD O-4 and above population.

Each of the military departments is now responsible for ensuring that it develops a cadre of Joint Specialists and keeps them competitive with their non-JSO counterparts. This is to be done without causing significant deterioration of war-fighting skills or personnel shortages in the operational fields.

Joint Specialty Officers are to be experts in their own service as a primary requirement for designation. Therefore, professional excellence in service performance and demonstrated superior performance in a occupational specialty are important criteria. One of the fundamental objectives of designating JSOs is to continue developing officers whose professional backgrounds coupled with joint education provide increased operational excellence in joint operations.

The Program for Joint Professional Military Education (PJE) is the body of principles and conditions that prescribe the course goals and learning objectives for officer JPME programs at the Intermediate and Senior level of military education. PJE is designed to:

1) Ensure that all students at PME colleges are knowledgeable in joint matters.

2) Prepare students for Joint Duty Assignments.

3) Satisfy the educational requirements for JSO nomination. [Ref. 24:III-1]

The Armed Forces Staff College conducts a Joint Transition Course (JTC) approximately one week long to help prepare direct entry officers (officers who directly enter Phase II JPME without having completed Phase I JPME) for the Phase II intermediate joint level education.

The "Military Education Policy Document" lists four approved sequences for JSO designation to accomodate

Service operational requirements and personnel management limitations (see also Figure 2). The sequences are:

1) Recommended Sequence. PJE Phase I, PJE Phase II, JSO nomination, joint duty assignment, JSO designation.

2) Critical Occupational Specialist Alternative 1. JSO nomination, joint duty assignment, PJE Phase I, PJE Phase II, JSO designation.

3) Critical Occupational Specialist ALternative 2 (CJCS Waiver Required). Joint Transition Course, PJE Phase II (direct entry), JSO nomination, joint duty assignment, PJE Phase I, JSO designation.

4) Nonresident Sequence. An Accredited PJE Phase I nonresident program, PJE Phase II, JSO nomination, joint duty assignment, JSO designation.

.... On a limited case-by-case basis, the Secretary of Defense may waive the JPME requirement if the officer has completed two full JDAs. [Ref. 24:III-2, III-3]

The sequences for JSO designation are designed to adhere to the intent of the initial Title IV legislation, and the subsequent amendments. Furthermore, a Statement of Congressional Policy was issued on 6 November, 1989 as follows:

As part of the efforts of the Secretary of Defense to improve professional military education, Congress urges, as a matter of policy, and fully expects the Secretary to establish the following: 1) A coherent and comprehensive framework for the education of officers, including officers nominated for the joint specialty. 2) A two-phase approach to strengthening the focus on joint matters, as follows:

a) Phase I instruction consisting of a joint curriculum, in addition to the principal curriculum taught to all officers at service-operated professional military education schools.

b) Phase II instruction consisting of a follow-on, solely joint curriculum taught at the Armed Forces Staff College to officers who are expected to be selected for the joint specialty. The curriculum should emphasize multiple "hands on" exercises and must adequately prepare students to perform effectively from the outset in what will probably be their first exposure to a totally new environment, as assignment to a joint, multiservice organization. Phase II instruction should be structured so that students progress from a basis knowledge of joint matters learned in Phase I to the level of expertise necessary for successful performance in the joint arena.

3) A sequenced approach to joint education in which the norm would require an officer to complete Phase I instruction before proceeding to Phase II instruction. An exception to the normal sequence should be granted by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff only on a case-by-case basis for compelling cause. Officers selected to receive such an exception should be required to demonstrate a basic knowledge of joint matters and other aspects of the Phase I curriculum that qualifies them to meet the minimum requirements established for entry into Phase II instruction without first completing Phase I instruction. The number of officers selected to attend an offering of the principal course of instruction at the Armed Forces Staff College who have not completed Phase I instruction should comprise only a small portion of the total number of officers selected. [Ref. 26:S14779-S14780]

The above Statement of Congressional Policy is incorporated in the "Military Education Policy Document" and the JSO designation process. The two-phase JPME policy and the limited number of direct entry officers into Phase II are ways the military departments are complying with the intent of Title IV.

A 1987 memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, William H. Taft IV, included detailed nomination and

selection procedures for the Joint Specialty. Secretary Taft's Memorandum specified that the military departments were responsible for nominating officers for the Joint Specialty. Nominations are to be made from among officers who are senior captains (or Navy lieutenants) or who are serving in a higher grade. The military departments are to notify the Director of the Joint Staff, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Manpower and Personnel Policy, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, (Force Management and Personnel), of all officers designated as nominees.

The recommendations for selection of officers for award of the Joint Specialty are forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for approval. The Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff and Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), in turn, are included in the routing to the Secretary of Defense. Performance records for officers recommended for JSO designation are expected to be of the same overall quality as officers selected for assignment to Service headquarters staff.

Implementing Title IV during the initial development period combined with the various pathways to the Joint Specialty award has led to the development of Joint Specialty Officer Eligibility Criteria. The Joint Specialty Qualification status identifies various types of JPME and JDA completions. An officer may have completed both JPME and JDA; or only completed JPME or JDA; or

completed a JDA first, then JPME. These various categories allowed different types of JSO qualifications to occur and must be identified. Table XII summarizes the various categories used for monitoring and tracking Joint Specialists with the JDAMIS automation.

TABLE XII JOINT SPECIALTY QUALIFICATION STATUS CODES

CATEGORY	JOINT EXPERIENCE
A	JPME then full JDA tour
B	Full JDA tour only
C	2 Year JDA only (COS only)
D	Less than Full JDA
E	JPME only
F	Full JDA then JPME
G	Less than full JDA, then JPME
H	JPME then less than full JDA
J	JPME then 2 years JDA COS

Source: JDAMIS

The size and composition of Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) is a key factor in determining how many officers are needed for JPME and how many officers are needed as Joint Specialists. As previously stated, fifty percent of the JDAL billets are to be filled by JSOs or JSO nominees that have completed JPME, or COS officers. Additionally, eighty percent of the critical billets are to be filled by JSOs or JSO nominees--the fill requirement becomes 100

percent for the critical billets in 1994. Table XIII identifies the total number of Joint Duty positions on the 1990 JDAL by service and rank.

These billets are distributed as shown in Table XIII to the military departments with 3234 (36 percent) for the Army, 1855 (21 percent) for the Navy, 3315 (37 percent) for the Air Force, and 489 (6 percent) for the Marine Corps. So with about 9000 billets, approximately one-half (or 4500) of the JDAL positions must be filled with JSOs, a JSO nominee that has completed JPME, or COS officer (limited to 25 percent). To meet the 50 percent requirement, approximately 3375 (37.5 percent) of the officers assigned to the JDAL must be filled with graduates of JPME since 1125 (12.5 percent) may be filled by COS officers that have not yet attended JPME. Furthermore, 820 (or 80 percent) of the 1025 critical billets must be filled with JSOs and this requirement becomes 100 percent in 1994. Positions identified as critical Joint Duty assignments, meaning "the officer should be particularly trained in and oriented toward joint matters", are shown in Table XIV.

Each of the service's personnel managers must manage these JDAL and critical positions to the "billet level". This requires officer assignment personnel to plan and examine individual qualifications for a particular billet and not simply send an officer to an organization for the command to place in an appropriate billet. Each organization, in turn, has JDAL positions, critical JDAL

TABLE XIII 1990 JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENT LIST BY SERVICE AND RANK

SERVICE	RANK				
	O4	O5	O6	O7-O10	TOTAL
ARMY	1120	1404	618	97	3239
NAVY	620	765	404	66	1855
AIR FORCE	1222	1360	640	93	3315
MARINE CORPS	185	216	73	15	489
DOD TOTAL	3147	3745	1735	280	8907

Source: Joint Staff, J-1

TABLE XIV 1990 CRITICAL OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (COS) BILLETS ON THE JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENT LIST

SERVICE	RANK			
	O5	O6	O7-O10	TOTAL
ARMY	185	186	19	390
NAVY	74	104	14	192
AIR FORCE	187	175	19	381
MARINE CORPS	30	29	3	62
DOD TOTAL	476	494	55	1025

Source: Joint Staff, J-1

positions, and non-JDAL position requirements that the services' personnel managers must fill. Operational requirements, officer availability, timing constraints, and service billet requirements all contribute to a complicated personnel management task. This billet level management requires more "micro-management" for the services' officer assignment personnel.

The Joint Staff is responsible for the management and control of the Joint Duty Assignment List. Specified and Unified Commands submit requests for adjustments and changes to the JDAL frequently. These requests include additions, deletions, specific service or rank requests, and billet adjustments or requirements. While numerous changes have occurred with the JDAL during the last four years, the list of Joint Duty Assignments, as a whole, has remained generally constant. Figure 3 shows the trends of the composition of the JDAL by service and rank. Basically, the total number of billets on the JDAL have increased and relative ratios between the four service Departments have remained constant. Critical billet trends are displayed in Figure 4. Again, a slight increase in the total size of the critical billets and stable service ratios are evident.

E. JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENT MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM (JDAMIS)

The Joint Duty Assignment Management Information System (JDAMIS) is another important tool for tracking, monitoring



Figure 3- Joint Duty Assignment List Trends by Service



Figure 4- Joint Duty Assignment List Trends for Critical Occupational Specialties

and reporting Joint Specialty Officer and Joint Duty Assignment information. The Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Joint Staff, developed the management information system using service input and the resources of the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). The first centralized automated report is scheduled for 1990.

Each military department is responsible for maintaining and updating their service's information for the JDAMIS data base. Service-generated reports are also available using the JDAMIS data base. The Joint Staff and the individual service departments will decrease the manhours required for report preparation when the JDAMIS reporting system is validated. JDAMIS can generate reports such as:

1) JSO and JSO Nominees designated;
2) Assignment of Officers Following JSO Designation;
3) Summary of Critical Occupational Specialties;
4) JDAs Excluded From Tour Length Averaging;
5) Average Tour Lengths;
6) Frequency of Waiver Usage;
7) JDAL Distribution and JDA Billet Fill Status.

Many of the required report summaries shown in the Appendix can be produced by JDAMIS. Again, JDAMIS will not make decisions about quality and selection of JSOs, but the information system is a tool for assisting personnel managers to meet the reporting and tracking requirements of Title IV.

F. SUMMARY

This chapter outlined the individual services' procedures for JPME and JSO selection. Some of the modeling tools available to assist policy and manpower planners were discussed. These models are designed to help with analysis of the impact of particular policies regarding Title IV implementation. The service selection procedures for JPME demonstrated the requirements for promotability and high quality input used by each military department. The JSO nomination and selection process linked with JPME sequencing and the size and composition of the JDAL was also presented.

The complexity of managing officers to the billet level for the JDAL was outlined. JPME requirements to meet the Joint Duty Assignment List size and composition of critical and non-critical billets demands micro-management by the services' personnel manpower, planners and assignment officers. An information system, Joint Duty Assignment Management Information System is also being developed to help with the personnel and manpower management tasking.

V. ANALYSIS OF PROCEDURES

A. OVERVIEW

Manpower management and personnel assignments are complex and detailed processes that must consider the needs of the individual officers, the service, and various billet qualification requirements. Managing the billets and assignments for Joint Specialty Officers involves matching individual qualifications with billet requirements and ensuring that the appropriate education and training occurs. This chapter analyzes this personnel management process, specifically, the Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) and Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) selection procedures that were presented in Chapter IV. Each military department's representation on the Joint Duty Assignment List is also evaluated. A brief discussion of using the Joint Duty Assignment Information System (JDAMIS) for Joint Specialty Officer management concludes the chapter.

B. ANALYSIS OF THE JOINT MANPOWER MANAGEMENT PROCESS

Chapter IV described the selection criteria for Joint Professional Military Education and designation of the Joint Specialty. The challenge for personnel managers is implementing the provisions of Title IV of the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act to meet the intent of Congress. The Joint Officer Management policies must also be integrated into service personnel management

systems. A major difficulty in integrating Title IV is managing Joint Specialists to the billet level. This billet level management requires assigning appropriately qualified officers to fill a particular billet with its own requirements and requisite qualifications instead of assigning an officer to a command. As a result there is need for greater personnel "micro-management" in order to meet mandated objectives and to comply with the myriad reporting requirements to Congress. Given the level of "micro-management" required for implementation details, the law significantly restricts the flexibility of the services' personnel management system.

Since the inception of the DOD Reorganization Act, the Joint Specialists, associated Joint Duty Assignments, and Joint Professional Military Education are receiving much greater attention throughout the services. Many of the Professional Military Education (PME) seats and joint duty billets have been previously filled by any available officer. However, the requirements of Title IV mandate that only quality officers can be sent to fill joint billets. Quality is difficult to define and quantify; essentially, it is defined by previous performance and the likelihood of potential promotability of an officer. While the officer corps requires high standards, there is not an infinite supply of high quality officers. Therefore, the selection and career management process must ensure both operational billets and joint billets receive top per-

formers. Additionally, the requirement for all National Defense University graduates and greater than fifty percent of other JPME graduates to be assigned to a joint duty tour for their next assignment has increased the emphasis on the quantity and quality of officers filling the educational opportunity billets.

Professional development for many of today's military officers emphasizes dual development paths in a warfare occupational specialty (or other support specialty) and in a subspecialty (or alternate occupational specialty). Qualification in the primary occupational specialty is still the foundation upon which each officer establishes potential future growth and promotability. Furthermore, as an officer progresses, each military service department has certain milestones that reflect achievement of standards of managerial competence and leadership skills which enhance an officer's opportunity for promotion. However, no single criterion such as Joint Professional Military Education, a Joint Duty Assignment, a graduate degree, or a particular occupational specialty guarantees success in the service. A blending of these and other career elements will characterize the career patterns of officers who have contributed effectively to the needs and top leadership positions of the military services.

To produce officers with the specific qualifications required for the joint duty assignments that will become available is indeed complex. The types of operational

skills required, tour length requirements, limited number of JPME seats available, and unit rotational cycles all combine to limit Joint Duty Assignment opportunities. All these requirements also restrict the personnel managers' flexibility in making assignments.

Although the JPME school seats have not been considered as vital to fill as operational units, they are required for JSO selection and they do help prepare officers for joint assignments. Additionally, the personnel managers must consider each officer's individual needs in support of operational development in order to place that officer into the most appropriate billet or school at the time in his or her career when that assignment can best serve both the service's and officer's needs. JPME is a personal benefit to individual officers; but, it also represents an institutional investment in human capital that is increasingly vital. Although operational excellence and maintaining a force ready for combat remains the priority for personnel managers, JPME seats also provide an avenue for the future leadership to develop and acquire valuable skills.

The selection process for identifying officers to fill JPME seats does not include identification of a specific future assignment. This process of selection and eventual school assignment is a function of individual timing and availability more than any other factor. There is no correlation required between military specialties of JPME

graduates and the specialties required for upcoming vacant Joint Duty Assignments. For example, a joint intelligance billet could become vacant in March and no current JPME graduate may have the skills required to fill the billet. So. the billet gets filled by a non-JPME graduate or filled by a graduate without billet matching qualifications, or the billet is not filled. This particular example is not unique to Joint Specialists, but the problem is multiplied by the many requirements of the billets and requisite officer qualifications.

Personnel managers must manage the officer population (by branch, division, specialty, etc.) to insure that officers with the right professional qualifications are available to match the specific qualifications required for each Joint Duty Assignment. So, selection for a Joint Duty Assignment is now a critical milestone in a officer's career development. This JDA assignment is particularly critical because it is now required for promotion to O-7. Selection to a JDA, however, remains primarily a personnel management action, as assignment managers must place officers in vacating billets.

There is no provision in the law to determine pre-requisite billet qualifications, nor is there a method of competitive JDA selection. Some billets require specific ranks or occupational specialties (i.e., an O-5 intelligence officer), while other billets may or may not be designated critical billets. The personnel managers must

attempt to match primary military occupational specialties (MOS), secondary MOSs, JSO status and critical/non-critical billets from the available inventory of transferable officers. Forecasting JDA requirements and integrating these requirements with JPME selection/assignment process can help provide appropriately qualified officers to fill JDA billets. An alternative method of management would be to change the legislation from a billet level to an organizational level assignment policy. This policy change would increase officer assignment flexibility and allow the commanders of the joint commands to use their JDA officers in whatever billets were needed to maximize the assigned officers' utility and the organization's effectiveness.

One of the key factors associated with the number of officers needed to fill JPME seats and JDAs is the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL). As stated earlier, fifty percent of the JDAL may be filled by non-JPME graduates. However, the law requires greater than fifty percent of the JPME graduates to be assigned to joint duty. In addition, eighty percent of the minimum 1000 critical billets on the JDAL must be filled with Joint Specialists, JSO nominees, or COS officers (less than 25 percent). Consequently, the personnel assignment officers must fill these specific billets with appropriately educated or qualified officers.

Filling the JDAs and implementing the two-phase JPME system is a personnel management challenge. The services are committed to sending as many Phase I graduates as

possible who are assigned joint duty to Phase II education enroute to their JDA. Other officers will need to receive Phase II education during or following their JDA tour to qualify as Joint Specialists. The services are honoring this commitment of sending Phase I graduates to Phase II by identifying officers who are recent graduates of resident services schools, specifically, academic years 1985-1989. These officers will help form a pool of potential candidates able to attend Phase II JPME. They can be designated JSO nominees upon completion of the Phase II education. This will allow more officers to progress toward JSO designation. This pool will also help the services comply with the legal mandate to fill the appropriate percentage of Joint Duty Assignment List billets with JSOs/JSO nominees. Using the 1985-1989 Service school graduates for JPME Phase II certification will also reduce the number of "direct entry" (non-Phase I graduate) students into the Phase II program.

The two-phase approach to JPME also has several limitations. First, Phase II JPME lacks the capability to accept all the Phase I graduates prior to their subsequent JDAs. The Armed Forces Staff College does not have the capacity in terms of physical facilities or staff to handle all Phase I graduates. Second, completion of the three-month Phase II program requires temporary duty enroute or from the many joint commands. This three month school is costly in terms of the command's travel/per diem funding,

gapped or vacant billets, and the lack of productivity (as perceived by the present command) of the officer attending the school.

Third, there is competition from graduate education programs. Few occupational specialties provide opportunity for an officer to obtain both fully-funded graduate education and a one year JPME plus 2-3 year JDA tour. The JPME system must not be so constructed that it forbids some of the Armed Forces' best officers from attending graduate schools. The diversity and utility derived from both the technical and non-technical graduate programs also contribute to the development of the military's future leadership. A graduate education can be beneficial, if not a requirement, for many JDA assignments.

A fourth limitation is the competition for critically short COS oficers and their requirements to fill key service billets. Some occupations have officer shortages, thus making it difficult to maintain a pool of highly qualified personnel. Congress has responded to some critical shortages of highly qualified officers by passing laws dealing with authorization for special incentive pays (i.e., Aviation Officer Continuation Pay, Submarine Pay, Sea Pay). Additionally, service billets require the skills of these scarce officers in operational units and headquarters staffs. Therefore, service needs will compete with Joint Duty Assignments for the same limited officer resources. As a result, service personnel managers must

allocate scarce officer resources between service related needs and joint requirements based on individual officer qualifications.

C. JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION SELECTION ANALYSIS

Each of the military departments has its own particular view of Professional Military Education. As explained in chapter IV, the Army clearly demonstrates the importance of completing both the intermediate and senior level schools by having the highest enrollment figures of all services. Table X in chapter IV showed 1004 Army students at the intermediate level schools (50 percent of all students) and 338 students in senior level schools (39 percent of all students). The Navy has shown less concern in acquiring Professional Military Education, but a greater interest at the senior level (184 Navy students at the senior level schools represented 46 percent of all Navy PME students). The Navy had viewed it important that an officer be screened and qualified to attend PME, but actual attendance has not previously been required for advancement. The Army, on the other hand, has virtually required completion of intermediate PME for promotion to lieutenant colonel.

The Air Force selection boards operate as a screen and then actually designate school assignments based upon a review of the officer's personnel records. The Marine Corps personnel managers recommend nominees for intermediate level schools to the Marine Corps Director of

Personnel Management for approval. The Commandant of the Marine Corps approves senior level school selections.

The services' philosophy on the criticality of Professional Military Education is somewhat reflected in the assignment practices to the various schools. The enrollment in intermediate and senior level schools are presented in Table XV and Table XVI. Basically, these tables show the relative size and percentages of officers enrolled in the professional military schools. Table XV, which was also presented in chapter IV, is shown again to illustrate that attending PME is a rare event. Table XV clearly shows the Army sends the most officers to the intermediate level schools, but those officers represent only six percent of the Army's O-4 population per year. The Navy sends the lowest percentage (1.6) of its officers to intermediate level PME, and only the Marine Corps sends fewer officers (208) than the Navy (215).

Table XVI is now introduced to illustrate that even fewer O-5/O-6s receive the opportunity for Professional Military Education. Again, the Army sends the most students (338), while the Army and the Marine Corps each have sent relatively the same percentage of the O-5/O-6 population to senior level school (2.2 percent for the Army and 2.7 percent for the Marine Corps). The Navy and Air Force each send about 1.6 percent of their O-5/O-6 population per year. Limited school seats available combined with the operational requirements and the command

TABLE XV OFFICERS IN INTERMEDIATE LEVEL PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION (ACADEMIC YEAR 1987-1988)

SERVICE	Number of Intermediate PME Students	Total Number of Majors/Navy Lieutenant Commanders (O-4s)	Percentage Intermediate Students of Total O-4s
ARMY	1004	16,791	6.0
NAVY	215	13,614	1.6
AIR FORCE	584	19,615	3.1
MARINE CORPS	208	3,214	6.5

Source: Student numbers from schools. Number of majors/Navy lieutenant commanders from "DOD Military Manpower Statistics" September 30, 1988. [Ref. 8:114]

TABLE XVI OFFICERS IN SENIOR LEVEL PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION (ACADEMIC YEAR 1987-1988)

SERVICE	Number of Senior PME Students	Total Number of O-5/O-6s	Percentage of Students of Total O-5/O-6s
ARMY	338	15,287	2.2
NAVY	184	11,797	1.6
AIR FORCE	280	17,935	1.6
MARINE CORPS	62	2,263	2,7

Source: Student numbers from schools. Number of O-5/O-6s from "DOD Military Manpower Statistics" September 30, 1988.

opportunities for these officers could be contributing factors to the low level of senior school enrollment.

Joint Professional Military Education enrollment in the service schools is becoming more joint-oriented as evidenced by Table XVII and illustrated in Figures 5-8. Table XVII shows each of the service schools' enrollment figures for 1987-1988, 1989-1990, and projected figures for 1990-1991. Of particular interest is the overall increase in intermediate level enrollment by each service. These increases are more apparent in Figures 5-8. The Navy's enrollment changes are clearly evidenced in Figures 5, 7, and 8. Although intermediate level school enrollments have increased, the senior level school enrollment numbers remain essentially the same (see Table XVII).

The Army sends so many officers to its intermediate service school that the other services' involvement appears negligible in Figure 5. Furthermore, each of these graphs show how the host service dominates enrollment at each service school. Higher student enrollment by the host services' officers is appropriate because the intent of the education review and subsequent restructuring was not to make each school a "purple suit" education institution, but for each school to maintain its service-oriented perspective while integrating more joint exposure and education into its syllabi. The Navy intermediate school, as shown in Figure 6 appears to have the most equitable

TABLE XVII STUDENT ENROLLMENT DISTRIBUTION FOR SERVICE SCHOOLS

SCHOOL	YEAR	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE	MARINE CORPS
ARMY	87-88	819	3	40	18
COMMAND &	89-90	861	8	40	16
STAFF	90-91	1100	10	50	20
NAVAL	87-88	32	97	12	21
COMMAND &	89-90	31	84	15	23
STAFF	90-91	31	102	30	23
AIR	87-88	44	4	433	7
COMMAND &	89-90	44	11	422	10
STAFF	90-91	44	26	407	10
MARINE	87-88	12	9	2	123
COMMAND &	89-90	12	12	12	121
STAFF	90-91	12	24	12	120
ARMY	87-88	201	8	18	9
WAR	89-90	200	8	18	9
COLLEGE	90-91	200	8	18	9
COLLEGE	87-88	34	98	13	28
NAVAL	89-90	30	98	15	27
WARFARE	90-91	30	101	15	27
AIR	87-88	20	10	169	5
WAR	89-90	20	9	164	5
COLLEGE	90-91	20	10	164	5

Source: Secretary of Defense Report, "Professional Military Education in the Services" August 8, 1990.



Figure 5- Army Command and General Staff College Student Enrollment Ratios



Figure 6- College of the Naval Command and Staff Student Enrollment Ratios



Figure 7- Air Command and Staff College Student Enrollment Ratios



Figure 8- Marine Corps Command and Staff College Student Enrollment Ratios

student representation and distribution among the service schools.

The change in focus of each school to include more joint oriented education and to have improved service representation is just beginning. The Phase II program will have its first graduates in 1990. Each of the services is committed to fulfilling the JPME requirements of Title IV for Joint Specialists. The next few years of implementing Phase I and Phase II education sequencing will demonstrate the effectiveness and weaknesses of the two-phased educational systems design.

D. NOMINATION AND SELECTION OF JOINT SPECIALTY OFFICERS

The policy memoranda and guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have allowed the services to begin implementing the provisions of Title IV. Legislative changes and the resolution of particular issues of eligibility and requirements have caused some initial Department of Defense and service response delays. Integrating the requirements of the law and the appropriate policy guidance concerning waivers and eligibility delayed initial JSO selection and Nomination.

The 1988 Secretary of Defense Report to Congress reported 12,165 officers had been selected for the Joint Specialty. This initial cadre of Joint Specialists consisted of several waiver groups as shown in Table XVIII. Officers fully qualified without waivers are listed as Type I. Type I includes officers who have completed both a

TABLE XVIII SELECTION OF OFFICERS FOR AWARD OF THE JOINT SPECIALTY (1988)

SERVICE	TYPE OF QUALIFICATION					
	TYPE I	TYPE II	TYPE III	TYPE IV	TYPE V	TOTAL
ARMY	215	40	2457	1420	310	4442
NAVY	47	23	1792	1017	0	2880
AIR FORCE	178	47	1961	1477	184	3847
MARINE CORPS	15	3	581	349	48	996
DOD	455	114	6791	4263	542	12165

NOTES: TYPE I includes officers who have completed both a joint professional military education (JPME) course and a subsequent joint duty assignment (JDA). TYPE II includes officers who have completed both the joint education and assignment prerequisites, but required a waiver for the sequence of the prerequisites. TYPE III includes officers who have completed a JDA, but required a waiver for the joint education course. TYPE IV includes officers who completed a joint education course, but received a waiver for completing a JDA. TYPE V includes officers who qualified for the joint specialty under the critical occupational specialty (COS) provision of the law.

SOURCE: Secretary of Defense Report to Congress (FY 1988)

joint professional military education course and a joint duty assignment. Only 455 officers (or 3.7 percent) were fully qualified by the normal JPME-JDA sequencing. Type II includes officers that have completed JPME and JDA but required a sequencing waiver. Only 114 officers (or less than one percent) qualified as Type II. Officers that have completed a JDA, but required a waiver for JPME are identified as Type III qualified. More officers qualified as Type III than any other category, 6,791 (or 55.8 percent). These officers were primarily from the pool of officers with previous JDA experience. Type IV identifies qualified officers that have completed a joint education course, but needed a JDA completion waiver. Many officers, 4,263 (or 35 percent), were also initially selected as JSOs in the Type IV category. Officers that qualified for the Joint Specialty under the critical occupational specialists provisons of the law are listed as Type V. There were 542 officers (or 4.5 percent) qualified as Type V JSOs. Each department's initial qualifications were appropriate for their relative overall size and the quantity of service billets on the Joint Duty Assignment List.

The 1989 summary of officers qualified for the Joint Specialty by service and type of qualification are shown in Table XIX. This Table shows that most officers (3,735 or nearly 70 percent) again qualified for the Type III category of the Joint Specialty. These Type III officers have completed a Joint Duty assignment, but required a JPME

TABLE XIX SELECTION OF OFFICERS FOR AWARD OF THE JOINT SPECIALTY (1989)

SERVICE	TYPE OF QUALIFICATION					
	TYPE I	TYPE II	TYPE III	TYPE IV	TYPE V	TOTAL
ARMY	33	27	1315	820	15	2210
NAVY	8	7	628	202	0	845
AIR FORCE	30	39	1537	241	10	1857
MARINE CORPS	12	1	255	160	3	431
DOD	83	74	3735	1423	28	5343

NOTES: TYPE I includes officers who have completed both a joint professional military education (JPME) course and a subsequent joint duty assignment (JDA). TYPE II includes officers who have completed both the joint education and assignment prerequisites, but required a waiver for the sequence of the prerequisites. TYPE III includes officers who have completed a JDA, but required a waiver for the joint education course. TYPE IV includes officers who completed a joint education course, but received a waiver for completing a JDA. TYPE V includes officers who qualified for the joint specialty under the critical occupational specialty (COS) provision of the law.

SOURCE: Secretary of Defense Report to Congress (FY 1989)

waiver. Type IV qualifications had the next highest number of officers qualifying for the Joint Specialty with 1,423 officers (26.6 percent). Again, the authority to waive the JDA requirement helped to qualify these officers. The waiver period ended October 1, 1989. Therefore, future JSO designations should be primarily Type I--having completed both JPME and JDA requirements.

The distribution of officers who have been awarded the Joint Specialty is comparable to the distribution of officers in grades O-4 and above for all the services. Figure 9 shows the distribution of officers in grades O-4 and above compared with the distribution of officers awarded the Joint Specialty. The Army and Marine Corps both show a slightly higher percentage of Joint Specialists relative to the other services. This could be expected, as the Army and Marine Corps send more of their officers to Professional Military Education (see Table XV and XVI of this chapter) and therefore, had a large eligible pool for the initial waiver period.

E. ANALYSIS OF THE JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENT LIST

Distribution of the Joint Duty Assignment List has remained relatively constant through the first four years. Table XX shows the percentages of billets on the JDAL that each service has had for the four year span. Of particular interest is the observation that no service ratio has changed by even one percent. Although the actual billets have changed in composition, rank, service affiliation, and



Figure 9- Joint Specialty Officer and Total 0-4 and Above Office Distribution Comparison

qualification criteria, the entire JDAL has only grown from 8,222 to 8,907 billets.

TABLE XX JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENT LIST COMPOSITION BY SERVICE (PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL JDAL)

SERVICE	YEAR			
	1987	1988	1989	1990
ARMY	36.2	36.5	36.2	36.4
NAVY	21.6	21.4	21.6	20.8
AIR FORCE	36.8	36.8	36.8	37.2
MARINE CORPS	5.3	5.3	5.3	5.5
N	8222	8363	8623	8907

Source: Joint Staff, J-1

Furthermore, the trends shown in Figures 3 and 4 of Chapter IV showed the constant distribution that each of the Services has maintained. The entire JDAL and the COS billets on the JDAL also show that the size of the JDAL has remained stable. The stability of the size and composition of the JDAL is important for planning the required flow of potential JSOs through the JPME phases since fifty percent of the JDAL billets must be filled by Joint Specialist, Joint Specialist nominees, or Critical Occupational Specialty officers. In addition, eighty percent of the designated critical billets must be filled by JSO nominees

or JSOs. After January 1, 1994, 100 percent of the critical JDAL billets must be filled by JSOs or JSO nominees. Consequently, having a stable JDAL contributes to the efficiency of placing JSO nominees in the JPME or JDA structure.

F. JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENT MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM

The Joint Duty Assignment Management Information System (JDAMIS) is designed to assist with the management of billet assignments. JDAMIS has not yet been validated and is being used more as a system to help generate annual reports than as a personnel management tool.

Maintaining the service data base is a lengthy process because of frequent modifications that have occurred in developing the system. The personnel data and billet data have potential to be used to match qualified people to billets. Keeping the billets updated with individual billet modifications that occur at the various joint commands is centralized through the Joint Staff. No billets are to be modified without service and Joint Staff approval. The JDAMIS data base includes files on joint billets, joint duty incumbents, promotions, JPME, joint duty qualifications and waiver file information. These files are currently used to assist with the reporting requirements.

G. SUMMARY

Blending the joint manpower management procedures with personnel assignment requirements and qualifications is the essential task of JSO management. The JPME selection, assignment, and follow-on tours to JDAs or other duty are critical steps towards JSO designation. The stability of the Joint Duty Assignment List will help to produce the Joint Specialists for Joint Duty Assignment matches. Getting specifically qualified officers positioned through JPME to fill specific JDA billets remains a key challenge.

VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. SUMMARY

This thesis explored the development and need for the creation of the Joint Specialty Officer established by Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Two of the primary purposes behind the development of the JSO were to improve the quality and increase the continuity of experience of officers placed in Joint Duty Assignments (JDA). The complexity and detailed requirements of the legislation were presented to illustrate the extent and magnitude of the mandated personnel management processes.

The Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) selection and assignment procedures and Joint Specialty Officer Designation procedures of the military service departments were presented and analyzed. The size and composition of the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) were also examined. The analysis indicated significant progress has occurred in implementing the requirements of Title IV and developing Joint Specialty Officers.

B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The complexity of Title IV and the Joint Officer management problem involves meeting many requirements and qualifications for the officers assigned to Joint Duty Assignments. The introduction of the two-phase Joint Professional Military Education system to qualify

prospective JSOs contributes to the complexity of personnel managers assignment options. Since the waiver period for JDA or JPME waivers expired in 1989, the personnel maangers must identify and track JSO nominees and JSOs to ensure appropriate Joint Duty Assignment opportunities are capitalized.

The analysis of JPME, JSO designations, and the JDAL leads to the conclusion that the Joint Specialty designation process requires increased manpower assignment flexibility. Specifically, not all Phase I JPME graduates will attend Phase II JPME enroute to their JDAs. Therefore, those officers who must attend Phase II JPME during their JDA or after their JDA tour should be identified and targeted to attend Phase II JPME to meet the JSO designation criteria. Joint Duty commands must be willing to send officers to Phase II JPME during their JDA even though this is costly, as the officer will not be able to contribute to the productivity of the command during the three month school. The other option is to send the officer to Phase II after the JDA enroute to his or her next assignment. Operational requirements at the JDA command and next duty command will compete with the JSO Phase II education requirement. Additional study is warranted on the assignment efficiency of officers that do not attend Phase II enroute to their JDA. An examination of the timing, costs, and difficulties of attending Phase

II JPME could lead to a more effective method of obtaining the Phase II education.

The JSO designation process outlined in Chapter IV is a valid methodology for designating officers for the Joint Specialty. Figure 1 in Chapter IV outlines the basic process and Figure 2 describes the four primary avenues towards JSO designation. The intent of the law is first obtain the joint education, then serve in a JDA. Exceptions are permitted for COS officers and the Secretary of Defense can waive the JPME-JDA sequence on a case-by-case basis. The exceptions are designed to improve the efficiency and personnel manager flexibility in assignment policies.

This two-phase education system designed to bridge officers' perspectives from service-orientation to joint-orientation is important; however, the improved quality of officers assigned to JDA can help to achieve the objective of increased operational effectiveness in joint operations. The required educational sequence should be waivable for any officer who can serve in a Joint Duty Assignment prior to JPME, not only COS officers. The knowledge gained through joint duty experience coupled with high quality officer input can help keep operational effectiveness high without the rquired JPME-JDA sequencing. The rigid JPME-JDA sequencing for non-COS officers becomes less critical with multiple JDA tours since Joint Specialists can serve in more than one JDA during their careers. Furthermore,

one of the objectives of designating Joint Specialists is to allow those designated officers to serve multiple tours.

The management of the Joint Duty Assignment List appears to be stable and the reduced fluctuations between billets authorized on the JDAL should reduce inefficiencies in preparing and assigning the right people to the right billets. Many joint duty billets are not, however on the JDAL for joint duty credit. Assignment to a command rather than to specific billets could be an alternative method of managing Joint Duty Assignments.

The Joint Staff could manage the joint assignment billets at the organizational command level instead of the billet level. Critical joint assignments could still be identified by billet, if required, but the Joint Duty Assignment organization commanders should have the authority to assign joint officers where their skills and qualifications can be used most effectively for that command. This will simplify the Joint Duty Assignment process and give added flexibility to the service personnel and manpower managers.

The Joint Duty Assignment Management Information System (JDAMIS) can be used more by the services as a manpower management tool. As the database system is used to help with standard routine procedures, the upkeep will become more of a help than an administrative burden to the services' manpower managers. The computer system reduces report generating time and can improve accuracy with an

updated and frequently used database. Furthermore, th... manpower managers will have a vested interest in the quality and accuracy of the database if used for frequently occurring JDA, JPME, JSO, and other personnel assignment purposes. An updated user-friendly manual for updating and managing the systems database will be beneficial for the Joint Staff and each of the military department's personnel manpower managers.

Title IV implementation progress is demnstrated by the adjustments to the legislation that were intitated by the department of Defense and the Congress. The revision to JPME will have a major impact on the production efficiency of awarding the Joint Specialty. Although the benefits of reducing the required minimum joint duty tour lengths and extending the JSO transition period helped with the implementation progress, the two-phase JPME system has made implementing Title IV more difficult. The rigid three-month Phase II JPME sequencing makes for tough choices for joint commanders. Mandating compliance with Phase II attendance will work, but at a potential cost of vacant joint billets.

The operational impact of one-year JPME combined with a minimum two-year or three-year JDA tour will become more apparent as the size of the Armed Forces is reduced by the proposed 25 percent during 1990-1995. This minimum combined 3-4 year period to develop and "grow a JSO" will result in benefits to the Joint Duty Assignment commands as

the improved quality and stability goals for the JSO program are met. The costs include the potential deterioration of war-fighting skills and opportunity costs of losing these personnel from their primary service occupations.

As the size of the Armed Forces and associated budgets are reduced, the return for the investment of high quality, stable joint-oriented staff will increase. Future military operations will most likely require a joint perspective in both planning and execution. The individual service departments will also benefit from having joint-oriented and indoctrinated officers return to their primary occupational specialties with more joint education, experience, and a joint perspective.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Future research can focus on implementing JDAMIS to identify vacancies and required qualifications to help ensure officers are assigned efficiently. Since, by law, a large percentage of the joint assignments will be filled directly by graduates of JPME, improvements in forecasting will particularly enhance the selection of JPME students. Earlier forecasting could also promote improved matching of qualified officers with specific billet requirements.

The impact and effect of the two-phase JPME system on the JSO qualification sequencing and filling subsequent Joint Duty Assignment billets can be examined. The possibility of using a non-resident Phase II course with

perhaps a minimum one-week or two-week seminar period for application and war gaming could be explored as an alternative approach to qualifying officers for the Phase II education. The JPME requirments and educational bridge towards acquiring a joint perspective might be achieved by an effective non-resident course combined with seminars composed of officers representing each branch of the armed forces. Investigating the potential for non-resident JPME programs could possibly help increase the efficiency of the JSO designation process.

APPENDIX

EXAMPLES FROM THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE'S REPORT TO CONGRESS (FY1989)

Selection of Officers for Award of the Joint Specialty (FY1989)

Table A-1

Service	I	II	III	IV	V	Total
Army	33	27	1315	820	15	2210
Navy	8	7	628	202	0	845
USMC	12	1	255	160	3	431
USAF	30	39	1537	241	10	1857
DOD	83	74	3735	1423	28	5343

NOTES: TYPE I includes officers who have completed buth a joint professional military education (JPME) course and a subsequent joint duty assignment (JDA). TYPE II includes officers who have completed both the joint education and assignment prerequisites, but required a waiver for the sequence of the prerequisites. TYPE III includes officers who have completed a JDA, but required a waiver for the joint education course. TYPE IV includes officers who completed a joint education course, but received a waiver for completing a JDA. TYPE V includes officers who qualified for the joint specialty under the critical occupational specialty (COS) provision of the law.

Critical Occupational Specialties

Table A-2

The following military specialties, listed by service, are designated as critical occupational specialties. In every case, the specialties so designated are each service's "combat arms" specialties.

Army	Navy	USAF	USMC
Infantry	Surface	Pilot	Infantry
Armor	Submariner[a]	Navigator	Tanks/AAV
Artillery	Aviation	Air Weapons Director[a]	Artillery
Air Defense Artillery	SEALs[a]	Missile Operations[a]	Air Control/Air Support/AntiAir
Aviation	Special Operations	Space Operations[a]	Aviation
Special Operations		Operations Mgt	Engineers
Combat Engineers			

a Combat arms military occupational specialties which have a severe shortage of officers.

Critical Occupational Specialty Officers

Table A-3

Category	Army	Navy	USAF	USMC	Total
JSO Nominee	139	173	1099	97	1508
JSO Nominee in a JDA	139	160	986	90	1375
JSO Nominee in a JDA, no JPME	43	43	967	89	1140
Completed a JDA and at JPME	2	11	7	0	20
Completed JPME in FY 89	326	185	266	160	937
Selected for JSO	1146	546	961	272	2927

Critical Occupational Specialty Officers

Table A-4

	2nd JDA						Critical JDA					
	FQ			Q/FQ			FQ			Q/FQ		
	Have Srvd	Are Srvg	Ttl	Have Srvd	Are Srvg	Ttl	Have Srvd	Are Srvg	Ttl	Have Srvd	Are Srvg	Ttl
Army	10	123	133	0	26	26	1	34	35	0	1	1
Navy	0	13	13	0	3	3	0	3	3	0	1	1
USAF	0	25	25	2	1	3	0	7	7	3	1	4
USMC	0	2	2	0	2	2	0	1	1	0	1	1
Total	10	163	173	2	32	34	1	45	46	3	4	7

Officers Nominated for the Joint Specialty

Table A-5

	Nominated (COS)	Total Nominated
Army	139	168
Navy	43	173
USAF	1099	1174
USMC	97	97
Total	1378	1602

JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENT OBJECTIVES
Annual Report on FY 1989 Promotion Rates

Promotion rates required by the DoD Reorganization Act of 1986, with the intent to measure the quality of officers assigned to joint duty, are attached in the following pages. Brief explanations for the "in zone" categories where the required promotion objectives were not met are consolidated in Table A-6. As reported in September 1989, the Joint Staff and joint commanders have seen a noticeable improvement in the quality of officers assigned. Since that report was submitted, a joint study group has begun looking at the current methods of measuring the quality of officers to determine if the Department is capturing the best data available. Preliminary results of that group's effort show that promotion rates appear to be the best objective measure of quality; however, this methodology does have some shortcomings.

For example, many cases where promotion objectives were not achieved were a result of small populations, many where only one officer with joint experience was eligible, and cases where one additional selectee would have meant meeting or exceeding the promotion objective. Also, FY 1989 boards contained some officers who were still in joint duty assignments based on pre-Act assignment practices — the net result being lower joint promotion rates. It will be another year before the joint promotion statistics fully reflect the post-Goldwater-Nichols assignment practices.

Other areas of concern include the above/below zone statistics and the exclusion of some officers from the statistics. Above and below zone statistics are difficult to compare and analyze because of the extremely low promotion opportunity in these zones. Additionally, the different promotion philosophies for above/below zone promotions of the Services complicates the analysis. Furthermore, the requirement to exclude joint specialty officers serving in the "other joint duty" category does not appear to be a reasonable measure of the quality in this category. Lastly, many quality officers assigned to joint duty will not be reflected in the statistics for many years. For example, on the FY 1989 Army Colonel Selection Board, due to assignment timing, 147 of the 540 officers selected in-zone were senior service college students. When these officers are included in the statistics based on their subsequent assignments (2 months after the board), the joint promotion rates are considerably higher (see Note #5 in Table A-6).

The joint study group is looking closely at these areas of concern to determine better ways to monitor the Department's progress toward this important objective of assigning quality officers to joint duty.

NOTE: In the tables that follow, a dash (-) indicates there were no eligible officers in that category and a "N/A" means that no such category exists for that rank.

Promotion Rates

Table A-6

Rank	Joint Categories	Are Serving In (In Percent)			Have Served In (In Percent)			Remarks
		In Zone	Below Zone	Above Zone	In Zone	Below Zone	Above Zone	
Air Force Promotion Rates (Line)								
O-8	Joint Staff	25	N/A	N/A	50	N/A	N/A	See note 2
	Joint Specialty	38	N/A	N/A	38	N/A	N/A	
	Service HQS	37	N/A	N/A	14	N/A	N/A	
	Other Joint	0	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	See note 1
	Service Average	36	N/A	N/A	36	N/A	N/A	
O-7	Joint Staff	4	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	See note 2
	Joint Specialty	3	N/A	N/A	3	N/A	N/A	See note 3
	Service HQS	4	N/A	N/A	2	N/A	N/A	
	Other Joint	0	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	See notes 2 & 3
	Service Average	2	N/A	N/A	2	N/A	N/A	
O-6	Joint Staff	58	2	40	67	0	—	See note 2
	Joint Specialty	68	5	14	68	5	14	
	Service HQS	59	4	11	58	23	7	
	Other Joint	42	1	6	27	1	3	See notes 3 & 4
	Service Average	44	3	3	44	3	3	
O-5	Joint Staff	91	8	60	100	0	0	See note 2
	Joint Specialty	93	6	67	93	6	33	See note 2
	Service HQS	92	8	19	100	14	0	
	Other Joint	70	2	10	69	3	9	
	Service Average	6	3	7	64	3	7	
O-4	Joint Staff Joint Specialty Service HQs Other Joint Service Average	(No Board in FY 89)						
Army Promotion Rates (Army Competitive Category)								
O-8	Joint Staff	33	—	N/A	33	—	N/A	See note 2
	Joint Specialty	47	—	N/A	47	—	N/A	See note 2
	Service HQS	40	—	N/A	50	—	N/A	
	Other Joint	46	—	N/A	36	—	N/A	
	Service Average	36	—	N/A	36	—	N/A	
O-7	Joint Staff	8	—	N/A	2	—	N/A	See note 2
	Joint Specialty	3	—	N/A	3	—	N/A	See note 3
	Service HQS	2	—	N/A	7	—	N/A	
	Other Joint	7	—	N/A	6	—	N/A	
	Service Average	2	—	N/A	2	—	N/A	

Promotion Rates (Continued)

Table A-6

Rank	Joint Categories	Are Serving In (In Percent)			Have Served In (In Percent)			Remarks
		In Zone	Below Zone	Above Zone	In Zone	Below Zone	Above Zone	
O-6	Joint Staff	53	0	6	17	5	—	See note 3
	Joint Specialty	47	2	2	47	2	—	
	Service HQS	40	0	0	35	4	—	
	Other Joint	28	0	1	12	0	—	See note 5
	Service Average	41	2	1	41	2	—	
O-5	Joint Staff	100	17	0	100	0	—	
	Joint Specialty	79	7	16	79	6	23	See note 4
	Service HQS	80	7	12	75	18	25	
	Other Joint	68	5	2	49	2	2	See note 4
	Service Average	61	6	5	61	6	5	
O-4	Joint Staff	100	—	—	100	100	—	
	Joint Specialty	—	—	—	—	—	—	
	Service HQS	86	11	—	86	11	—	
	Other Joint	86	—	—	86	—	—	
	Service Average	69	3	19	69	3	19	
Marine Corps Promotion Rates (Unrestricted)								
O-8	Joint Staff	—	—	N/A	—	—	N/A	
	Joint Specialty	44	—	N/A	44	—	N/A	See note 6
	Service HQS	75	—	N/A	20	—	N/A	
	Other Joint	—	—	N/A	50	—	N/A	
	Service Average	42	—	N/A	42	—	N/A	
O-7	Joint Staff	25	—	N/A	0	—	N/A	See note 1
	Joint Specialty	4	—	N/A	—	—	N/A	
	Service HQS	4	—	N/A	2	—	N/A	
	Other Joint	40	—	N/A	0	—	N/A	See note 1
	Service Average	3	—	N/A	3	—	N/A	
O-6	Joint Staff	100	0	10	—	0	—	
	Joint Specialty	60	0	0	60	—	0	See note 2
	Service HQS	63	0	11	62	0	8	
	Other Joint	39	0	13	33	0	0	See note 2
	Service Average	45	0	6	45	0	6	
O-5	Joint Staff	78	0	—	100	0	—	
	Joint Specialty	78	0	0	78	0	0	
	Service HQS	78	0	4	67	0	11	
	Other Joint	75	0	0	40	0	29	See note 2
	Service Average	60	0	6	60	0	6	
O-4	Joint Staff	—	—	—	—	—	—	
	Joint Specialty	—	—	—	—	—	—	
	Service HQS	67	0	25	67	0	0	
	Other Joint	33	0	0	50	—	0	See note 3
	Service Average	67	0	17	67	—	17	

Promotion Rates (Continued)

Table A-6

Rank	Joint Categories	Are Serving In (In Percent)			Have Served In (In Percent)			Remarks
		In Zone	Below Zone	Above Zone	In Zone	Below Zone	Above Zone	
Navy Promotion Rates								
O-8 Unrestricted Line	Joint Staff	—	—	N/A	—	—	N/A	
	Joint Specialty	50	14	N/A	—	—	N/A	
	Service HQS	50	40	N/A	—	—	N/A	
	Other Joint	33	0	N/A	—	—	N/A	See note 2
	Service Average	54	17	N/A	—	—	N/A	
Cryptology	Joint Staff	100	—	N/A	—	—	N/A	
	Joint Specialty	—	—	N/A	—	—	N/A	
	Service HQS	—	—	N/A	—	—	N/A	
	Other Joint	—	—	N/A	—	—	N/A	
	Service Average	100	—	N/A	—	—	N/A	
Supply	Joint Staff	—	—	N/A	—	—	N/A	
	Joint Specialty	100	0	N/A	—	—	N/A	
	Service HQS	—	—	N/A	—	—	N/A	
	Other Joint	—	—	N/A	—	—	N/A	
	Service Average	67	17	N/A	—	—	N/A	
O-7 Unrestricted Line	Joint Staff	0	6	—	—	—	N/A	See note 2
	Joint Specialty	2	3	—	—	10	N/A	See note 2
	Service HQS	3	8	—	—	—	N/A	
	Other Joint	0	1	—	—	—	N/A	See note 2
	Service Average	1	3	—	—	3	N/A	
Civil Engineer	Joint Staff	—	—	N/A	—	—	N/A	
	Joint Specialty	0	0	N/A	—	—	N/A	
	Service HQS	0	0	N/A	—	—	N/A	
	Other Joint	0	0	N/A	—	—	N/A	
	Service Average	0	0	N/A	—	—	N/A	
Engineering Duty	Joint Staff	—	—	N/A	—	—	N/A	
	Joint Specialty	0	0	N/A	—	—	N/A	
	Service HQS	0	0	N/A	—	—	N/A	
	Other Joint	—	0	N/A	—	—	N/A	See note 1
	Service Average	0	2	N/A	—	—	N/A	
Public Affairs	Joint Staff	0	—	N/A	—	—	N/A	See note 1
	Joint Specialty	20	0	N/A	20	—	N/A	See note 6
	Service HQS	50	—	N/A	—	—	N/A	
	Other Joint	0	0	N/A	—	—	N/A	See note 2
	Service Average	11	0	N/A	11	—	N/A	
Supply	Joint Staff	0	0	N/A	—	—	N/A	
	Joint Specialty	0	3	N/A	—	—	N/A	
	Service HQS	0	0	N/A	—	—	N/A	
	Other Joint	0	0	N/A	—	—	N/A	
	Service Average	0	3	N/A	—	—	N/A	

Promotion Rates (Continued)

Table A-6

Rank	Joint Categories	Are Serving In (In Percent)			Have Served In (In Percent)			Remarks
		In Zone	Below Zone	Above Zone	In Zone	Below Zone	Above Zone	
O-6 Unrestricted Line	Joint Staff	67	0	25	—	0	—	
	Joint Specialty	70	0	0	—	—	—	
	Service HQS	38	2	0	100	0	—	
	Other Joint	28	0	0	0	0	0	See note 7
	Service Average	49	2	2	49	2	—	
Civil Engineer	Joint Staff	—	—	—	—	—	—	
	Joint Specialty	0	0	—	—	—	—	See note 2
	Service HQS	50	0	—	—	—	—	
	Other Joint	0	0	0	—	—	—	See note 1
	Service Average	46	0	11	—	—	—	
Aeronautical Engineer	Joint Staff	—	—	—	—	—	—	
	Joint Specialty	0	0	—	—	—	—	See note 1
	Service HQS	100	0	—	—	—	—	
	Other Joint	—	0	0	—	—	—	
	Service Average	45	0	7	—	—	—	
Cryptology	Joint Staff	—	—	—	—	—	—	
	Joint Specialty	0	0	100	—	—	—	
	Service HQS	0	0	—	—	—	—	
	Other Joint	0	0	13	—	—	—	See note 1
	Service Average	33	4	8	—	—	—	
Engineering Duty	Joint Staff	—	—	—	—	—	—	
	Joint Specialty	—	—	—	—	—	—	
	Service HQS	—	33	—	—	—	—	
	Other Joint	0	0	—	—	—	—	See note 1
	Service Average	50	2	—	—	—	—	
Intelligence	Joint Staff	—	—	—	—	—	—	
	Joint Specialty	0	0	0	—	—	—	
	Service HQS	0	0	0	—	—	—	
	Other Joint	0	0	8	—	—	—	See note 2
	Service Average	44	6	4	—	—	—	
Oceanography	Joint Staff	0	—	—	—	—	—	
	Joint Specialty	0	0	—	—	—	—	
	Service HQS	0	0	—	—	—	—	
	Other Joint	—	0	—	—	—	—	
	Service Average	55	3	—	—	—	—	
Public Affairs	Joint Staff	—	—	—	—	—	—	
	Joint Specialty	67	0	—	—	—	—	See note 2
	Service HQS	100	0	—	—	—	—	
	Other Joint	67	0	0	—	—	—	
	Service Average	44	7	0	—	—	—	
Supply	Joint Staff	—	0	—	—	—	—	
	Joint Specialty	0	0	—	—	—	—	
	Service HQS	—	0	—	—	—	—	
	Other Joint	14	0	0	—	—	—	See note 2
	Service Average	44	2	3	—	—	—	

Promotion Rates (Continued)

Table A-6

Rank	Joint Categories	Are Serving In (In Percent)			Have Served In (In Percent)			Remarks
		In Zone	Below Zone	Above Zone	In Zone	Below Zone	Above Zone	
O-4 Unrestricted Line	Joint Staff	67	0	0	—	0	0	See note 2
	Joint Specialty	—	—	—	—	—	—	
	Service HQS	75	4	0	100	0	0	
	Other Joint	55	1	0	50	0	—	See note 3
	Service Average	73	2	15	73	2	15	
Cryptology	Joint Staff	—	—	—	—	—	—	
	Joint Specialty	—	—	—	—	—	—	
	Service HQS	—	50	—	—	—		
	Other Joint	0	0	0	—	—	—	See note 2
	Service Average	69	3	10	—	—	—	
Engineering Duty	Joint Staff	—	—	—	—	—	—	
	Joint Specialty	—	—	—	—	—	—	
	Service HQS	—	—	—	—	—	—	
	Other Joint	50	0	—	—	—	—	See note 2
	Service Average	78	1	—	—	—	—	
Intelligence	Joint Staff	—	—	—	—	—	—	
	Joint Specialty	—	—	—	—	—	—	
	Service HQS	—	—	—	—	—	0	
	Other Joint	67	0	0			0	See note 2
	Service Average	80	2	0			2	
Oceanography	Joint Staff	—	—	—	—	—	—	
	Joint Specialty	—	—	—	—	—	—	
	Service HQS	—	—	—	—	—	—	
	Other Joint	67	0	—	—	—	—	See note 2
	Service Average	74	0	—	—	—	—	
Supply	Joint Staff	—	—	—	—	—	—	
	Joint Specialty	—	—	—	—	—	—	
	Service HQS	0	—	—	—	—	—	
	Other Joint	67	0	0	—	0	—	See note 2.
	Service Average	64	2	26	—	2	—	

Notes:

1. Small numbers involved — only one officer with joint experience eligible for promotion in this competitive category.
2. Small numbers involved — one additional selection in this promotion category needed to meet promotion objective.
3. Smal numbers involved — less than 3 1/2% of eligible population; comparison and analysis is inconclusive.
4. Within 2% of meeting promotion objective.
5. If the Senior Service College students who were selected for promotion were included with their post-PME organization, the promotion rate for "other joint duty" would have been 47% — exceeding the service average by 6%.
6. Small numbers involved — if one more joint specialist officer and one less Service Headquarters General Officer were selected, the promotion objective would have been met.
7. Several non-selectees were assigned to joint positions under pre-DoD Reorganization Act assignment policies. Now quality officers are being assigned to their positions, i.e., O-6 promotion rates for those assigned in 1989 were 73% compared to 49% service average.

Analysis of the Assignment of Officers Following Selection for the Joint Specialty

Table A-7

Category	Army	Navy	USAF	USMC	Total
Command	246	174	179	59	658
Service HQ	130	89	54	46	319
Joint Staff					
Critical	6	3	6	2	17
Other JDA	37	9	14	3	63
Total	43	12	20	5	80
Other Joint					
Critical	98	30	50	11	189
Other JDA	283	70	123	33	509
Total	381	100	173	44	698
PME	192	93	70	16	371
Other Oper	337	65	97	139[a]	638
Other Staff	608	57[b]	306	63[a]	1034
Other Shore	—	357	—	14	371

The information in this chart identifies the first reassignment of an officer following selection for the joint specialty.

[a] For the Marine Corps, Other Oper = Fleet Marine Force and Other Staff = non-Fleet Marine Corps.

[b] For Navy, Other Staff includes other shore assignments.

Average Length of Tours of Duty in Joint Duty Assignments (FY 1989) (In Months)

Table A-8

	Joint Staff	Other Joint	Joint Total
General/Flag Officers			
Army	26	26	26
Navy	28	25	26
USMC	35	27	28
USAF	21[a]	29	28
DOD	26	27	27
Other Officers			
Army	35	40	40
Navy	37	40	39
USMC	38	37	37
USAF	40	41	41
DOD	37	40	40

[a] One of the five assignments in this category was unusually short, indirectly due to the change of administrations in early 1989.

Tour Length Exclusions

Table A-9

Category	Army	Navy	USAF	USMC	Total
Retirement	49	74	107	15	245
Separation	0	10	2	0	12
Suspension From Duty	5	1	4	0	10
Compassionate/Medical	15	5	2	1	23
Other Joint After Promotion	2	0	1	0	3
Deactivation of Unit	5	3	2	0	10
Joint Overseas	191	47	358	16	612
Joint Accumulation	33	0	0	0	33
COS Reassignment	68	29	19	7	123
Total	368	169	495	39	1071

Officer Distribution by Service (FY 1989)

Table A-10

	Joint Staff	Other Joint Duty	Total Joint Duty[a]	Total DOD (Percent)
Army	305	2814	3119 (36.2%)	35.3
Navy	237	1627	1864 (21.6%)	23.8
USMC	50	408	458 (5.3%)	6.6
USAF	339	2834	3173 (37.7%)	34.3
DOD	931	7721	8623	

[a] From Joint Duty Assignment List

Waiver Authority Use

Table A-11

	Army		Navy		USAF		USMC		Total		
Category	FG	GO	FG	FO	FG	GO	FG	GO	FG	GO	Total
A1	27	1	7	0	15	0	8	0	57	1	58
A2	42	0	3	0	23	7	13	4	81	11	92
B1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	2
B2	42	0	3	0	23	7	13	4	81	11	92
C1	3	NA	0	NA	1	NA	11	NA	15	NA	15
C2	24	NA	13	NA	37	NA	13	NA	87	NA	87
D1	44	7	26	4	16	5	4	0	90	16	106
D2	792	39	358	17	748	32	122	9	2020	97	2117
E1	NA	2	NA	13	NA	17	NA	0	NA	32	32
E2	NA	42	NA	22	NA	32	NA	11	NA	107	107
F1	NA	2	NA	6	NA	1	NA	1	NA	10	10
F2	NA	30	NA	15	NA	17	NA	8	NA	70	153
G1	NA	18	NA	19	NA	33	NA	3	NA	73	73
G2	NA	30	NA	15	NA	17	NA	8	NA	70	70
H1	2098	69	842	65	1806	24	418	0	5163	158	5321
H2	42	0	3	0	23	7	13	14	81	11	92

1 = Waiver was exercised
2 = No waiver was exercised
Waivers include: (A) JSO sequence waiver, (B) JSO two-tour waiver, (C) waiver of post-JPME JDA assignment for JSO, (D) JDA tour length waiver, (E) CAPSTONE course waiver, (F) waiver for promotion to O-7, (good of the service), (G) waiver for promotion to O-7, (sci/tech, professional, joint equivalence, navy nuclear), and (H) temporary waiver provisions for award of JSO.

Critical Positions Summary

Table A-12

Category	Army	Navy	USAF	USMC	TOTAL
Total Positions	381	201	382	60	1024
Vacant	21 (6%)	15 (7%)	43 (11%)	0 (0%)	79 (8%)
JSO Filled	276 (72%)	140 (70%)	289 (76%)	45 (75%)	750 (73%)
Non-JSO Filled	83 (22%)	46 (23%)	50 (13%)	15 (25%)	194 (19%)
Percent JSO Filled Since 1 Jan 89	82	85	84	82	04

Reasons Above Positions Were Not Filled By Joint Specialty Officers

Position filled by incumbent prior to being a joint position	68
Position being converted to a non-critical position or being deleted	8
Joint Specialist Officers not available	15
Best Qualified Officers not a Joint Specialist	18
Position filled by incumbent prior to being a critical position	47
Other	38
Total	194

JDA Positions Not Filled by Joint Specialists

Table A-13

The following joint organizations have joint duty billets not filled by joint specialists:

Organizations	JDA Positions Not Filled By JSOs
Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD)	8
Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA)	2
Defense Mapping Agency (DMA)	5
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)	6
Defense Communications Agency (DCA)	12
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)	15
Defense Attaches	2
National Security Agency (NSA)	5
Defense Mobilization Systems Planning Activity	1
US Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM)	5
US Central Command (USCENTCOM)	11
US European Command (USEUCOM)	14
US Pacific Command (USPACOM)	21
US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)	9
US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)	2
Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)	1
US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)	2
NATO Military Committee	1
Allied Command Europe (ACE)	20
Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT)	8
HQ North American Aerospace Command	6
Combined Field Army (CFA)	3
Joint Staff	22
National Defense University (NDU)	4
Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS)	4
Joint Warfare Center (JWC)	1
Joint Doctrine Center (JDC)	1
Military Entrance Processing Command (MEPCOM)	1
Total	194

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